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ABSTRACT 
As reflected by the literature, the environment of each country 
influences the characteristics of the budgetary process in that country. 
Often-cited factors which shape this environment are: economic wealth, 
financial predictability, political institutions, elite values, and 
size. Economic wealth and financial predictability are considered the 
most powerful. 
Economic wealth and financial predictability permit four classi­
fications of budgetary environments, namely: rich and certain, poor and 
certain, poor and uncertain, and rich and uncertain environments. Each 
of the first three classes of budgetary environments has been investi­
gated in the existing literature. However, the rich and uncertain 
environment remains more elusive to the investigator. 
This author believes that a government exists with sufficient 
wealth and environmental uncertainty to be classified in the fourth 
category. Namely, such government exists in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study was to examine empirically the characteristics 
of the governmental budgetary process in which the environment is uncer­
tain but where the government is rich. 
A combination of different research methods were used to gather 
the data for this study. This combination included library research, 
interviews, and empirical testing of the quantitative budgetary data. 
The findings, based on both research tools, are summarized as 
follows: 
ix 
(1) Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be characterized 
as a non-incremental process. Specifically, the interview results show­
ed that complexity in calculations was a common attribute throughout the 
budgetary process. This complexity led most cf the government agencies 
to either over- or underestimate their requests, thus compelling the 
Ministry of Finance to review the entire agency's requests instead of 
concentrating on the changes or the increments from the previous year's 
appropriation. The evidence from the quantitative budgetary data also 
supported this conclusion. The magnitude of changes in budgetary allo­
cations and actual expenditures for most of the cases studied were in 
the range of "non-incremental" process. 
(2) Supplemental budgeting was one of the major attributes of the 
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
(3) Lack of qualified personnel, lack of well defined decision cri­
teria, and the absence of modern data gathering techniques were observed 
through the budgetary process. 
(4) The budgetary participants showed a high level of strategizing. 
Spending agencies tend to exaggerate their estimates knowing that the 
Ministry of Finance would alter these estimates. 
(5) The spending agencies and the Ministry of Finance played major 
roles in the budgetary decisions. However, the Ministry of Finance 
seemed to influence those decisions more than did the individual agen­
cies. In particular, the majority of the agencies' budget directors 
viewed their role as "coordinator" among the agencies' departments in 
the formulation of both the agencies plans and annual requests as more 
than "decision maker." In contrast, the role of the senior staff of 
x 
*Vv 
the Ministry of Finance budget department could be viewed as "cutter" 
more than "efficiency economizer." 
The quantitative budgetary data seemed to support the interviews 
results, concerning the relationships between the budgetary partici­
pants. Significant positive correlations were found between budget 
expansion and both agency acquisitiveness and ministry of Finance sup­
port. The correlations between budget expansion and Ministry of 
Finance support was stronger than the correlations between budget 
expansion and agency acquisitiveness. Moreover, there were no signifi­
cant correlations among budget expansion and estimated revenue expan­
sion, actual revenue expansion, and spending efficiency. Since the 
Ministry of Planning has a major influence on agency acquisitiveness, 
the simple correlation indicated that these three organizations effected 
the final budgetary output. However, the multiple regressions analysis 
showed that the Ministry of Finance support was the most dominant 
>.<*L 
independent variable that explained most of the variation in budget 
expansion. 
xi 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
Governmental budgeting involves processing a complex series of 
social and political factors. Those who create budgets assume that a 
direct link will exist between the users of the funds as enumerated in 
the budget and future events. Hence, the budget might be conceived of 
as a model of intended behavior: a prediction. The budget thus becomes 
a means of integrating financial resources and human behavior to 
accomplish policy objectives. 
The governmental budgetary process throughout the world evokes 
theoretical and empirical questions such as: Theoretically, what 
behavioral and organizational theory(s) might explain the budgetary 
process? Empirically, what are the major characteristics of the pro­
cess? How do the process participants formulate the budget? And what 
roles and strategies will f.hey assume? 
Government budgets result from a plan of action in which differ­
ent groups play different roles according to each group's position 
within the organization. This notion suggests the plausibility of 
adopting the theory of Role Behavior which the behaviorists define as: 
...."The recurring actions of an individual, 
appropriately interrelated with the repetitive 
activities of others so as to yield a predict­
able outcome. The set of independent behaviors 
comprises a social system or subsystems.... or 
a stable collective pattern in which people 
play their parts."I 
The role behavior theory provides a theoretical foundation from 
which to explain and to predict the behavior of the participants in 
governmental budgetary processes. On the basis of the role behavior 
theory, Wildavsky postulated a general pattern of behavior in govern­
mental budgetary process no matter where it is practiced. This general 
2 
pattern of behavior consists of: 
(1) General Strategic Behavior 
Strategic behavior refers to the methods which the major budget­
ary participants utilize to get their ways. Apart from environmental 
or political differences, any governmental budgetary process includes 
two groups or participants: 
(a) The administrative agencies advocate increased expenditures 
and object budget to cut, or at least struggle to maintain the 
budget base. Since any administrative agency struggles to have 
more money in order to survive j?,rjd expand, this pattern of 
behavior exists in any budgetary environment. 
(b) The central control organs act as guardians of the public 
treasury. Since these groups know that the administrative 
agencies will continue to press for increased expenditures and 
that government sources are limited, they cut and trim in order 
to keep spending within boundaries of revenues. This general 
"4). KatZ' and P. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization 
(New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 174. 
2 
Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting; A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 5-9. 
3 
pattern of behavior is widespread in any environment. 
(2) The Degree of Complexity in the Calculations 
Complexity exists in any governmental budgetary process, and 
budget participants in any environment adapt what is referred to as 
"aids to calculations" in order to overcome this complexity. They 
simplify decision making by proceeding from a historical base in order 
to concentrate on proposed new increments. Also, padding, across the 
board cuts, and increasing spending at the end of the year are general 
3 patterns of behavior in any governmental budgetary process. 
Wildavsky pointed out that the environment of each country 
influences the characteristics of budgetary process in that country and 
hence, alters the behavior of the major participants in that process 
from the general pattern. The most important factors which shape this 
environment are: political institutions, size, elite values, economic 
4 
wealth, and financial predictability. 
Although the differences in sizes, political institutions, and 
elite values among countries might alter the behavior of budgetary 
participants, these differences are considered relatively small in 
comparison with the effect of economic wealth and financial predict­
ability. In this context, Wildavsky argued that the combination of 
economic wealth and financial predictability control all other variables. 
This argument is based on the assumption that wealth and predictability, 
as well as poverty and uncertainty, homogenize behavior."* For example, 
3 
Ibid., p. 9. 
A 
lb id., p. 10. 
5Ibid., p. 11. 
4 
there are common budgetary characteristics in the United Kingdom and 
in the United States, even though these two countries differ in their 
size, in their political institutions, and in their elite values. On 
the other hand, there are sharp differences in the characteristics of 
the budgetary processes in the United States and in India. 
In another example, Wildavsky argued that the characteristics 
of the budget process in the Soviet Union at macro level are similar 
to those in rich, Western nations even though there are extremely sharp 
differences in their political institutions. He based this argument on 
the fact that wealth and predictability determine the main features of 
the budgetary process in the Soviet Union and in other Western 
6 
nations. This assertion does not mean that the budgetary processes 
are identical in the same environment. As a matter of fact, when com­
paring the budgetary processes of nations having the same degree of 
economic wealth and financial predictability, one finds that differences 
in size, political institutions, and elite values have a major effect. 
So, economic wealth and financial predictability are considered the 
most powerful variables only for the purpose of comparing the charac­
teristics of budgetary process in different budgetary environments. 
Economic wealth refers to the availability of resources with 
which to finance the budgetary goals. Rich countries are those with 
economic wealth sufficient to finance needed programs. Poor countries 
have precisely the opposite conditions.^ -
Financial predictability refers to the ability to anticipate 
^Ibid., p. 18. 
^Ibid., p. 10. 
flows of available resources in relation to spending commitments. 
Certain countries have the ability to calculate the flow of expendi­
tures and revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project them 
into the near future. Uncertain nations have precisely the opposite 
8 
conditions. 
In order to draw a line between rich and poor, and certain and 
uncertain countries, one must define operationally the economic wealth 
and financial predictability factors. The per capita gross national 
product has been used in economics as a leading indicator of the degree 
of economic wealth in a given nation. So, a poor country is simply one 
with a per capita gross national product that is low relative to the 
present-day per capita national product of such nations as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the nations of most of Western Europe. 
Thus, economic wealth is a relative concept, and in order to define a 
given country as rich or poor, this country's per capita must be com­
pared with a pre-determined scale for rich and poor countries. 
Wildavsky defined poor countries as those with per capita income of 
9 
less than $900.00. 
Trying to distinguish between certain and uncertain budgetary 
environments is also difficult because of uncertain world conditions, 
and there is no pure budgetary system where future revenues and/or 
expenditures are consistently and accurately forecasted. But, in 
general, the certain budgetary environments are those where future 
revenues and/or expenditures are projected with a high probability of 
Q 
Ibid., p. 10. 
9Ibid., 136. 
6 
occurrence. The uncertain budgetary environments are those where 
future revenues and/or expenditures are projected with a low proba­
bility of occurrence. A given high and low probability of occurrence 
is a relative concept, and in order to determine whether a given 
budgetary environment is certain or uncertain, one must compare the 
forecasting ability of the system to project the revenues and/or 
expenditures with a predetermined certain environment, such as the 
United States. The uncertain budgetary environments have common 
attributes, such as lack of sufficient information, lack of educated 
and trained personnel, lack of political stability, lack of diversi­
fication of sources of revenues, and lack of administrative capa­
bility.10 
Under this wealth and predictability model, four categories of 
budgeting environments can occur: 
1. Rich and certain environments (RCE) 
2. Poor and certain environments (PCE) 
3. Poor and uncertain environments (PUE) 
4. Rich and uncertain environments (RUE) 
The existing theoretical and empirical research in the govern­
mental budgetary process concludes that each budgetary environment has 
11 
common characteristics. RCE refers to a budgetary system which has 
the ability to mobilize sufficient resources or to control expenditures, 
or both, and which has the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures 
or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project them into 
10Ibid., p. 138. 
11Ibid., pp. 9-12. 
the near future. The budgetary processes in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and other Western nations are examples 
of this budgetary environment. According to Wildavsky, the budgetary 
process in these countries classified as rich and certain is 
incremental. Past decisions serve as bases from which future expen­
ditures are determined, and the budgetary processes are concerned with 
adding or subtracting a small percentage (increment) to or from the 
existing base. 
PCE refers to a budgetary system which is unable to mobilize 
sufficient resources, but which has the ability to calculate the flow 
of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to 
project them into the near future. The budgetary process in most 
American city governments is the best example of this budgetary envi­
ronment. Most American cities are in a poor resource position, but 
they have sufficient financial predictability. The budgetary process 
in this environment becomes a whole revenue control - orientation due 
to the poor resource position. City officials are aware of the needs 
of the city, but they must compromise their needs considerably in the 
fact of limited resources. So, the budgeting process in the poor and 
certain environment is revenue oriented because income determines 
expenditures. 
PUE refers to a budgetary system which is unable to mobilize 
sufficient resources (because of the lack of resources) or to control 
expenditures, or both, and which is unable to calculate the flow of 
expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project 
them into the near future. The budgetary process in India, Pakistan, 
8 
Egypt, and other poor countries is an example of this budgetary 
environment. The poor and uncertain nations employ a budgetary process 
of repetition. Poverty leads them to delay expenditures to insure that 
their financial resources are not depleted, whereas uncertainty causes 
them to reprogram funds repeatedly in order to adjust to rapidly 
changing conditions. So, the budgetary process in poor and uncertain 
environments can be characterized as repetitive budgeting. 
Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of the budgetary process 
12 
of the three classes. 
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However, the fourth class, those countries with rich and 
uncertain environments, remains more elusive to the investigator. 
As one authority on governemtnal budgeting states: 
12 Adapted from Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of 
Budgetary Process, p. 13. 
"Budgetary processes falling in the rich and 
uncertain box will not be discussed....because I 
have not been able to find accounts of comtemporary 
governments with those characteristics."13 
This author contends that a government exists with sufficient 
wealth and environmental uncertainty to be classified in the fourth 
category. Namely, such a government exists in Saudi Arabia, where the 
oil revenues available to the government are abundant, but the predict­
ability of future funds is uncertain. Saudi Arabia does not possess 
the productive factors of manufacturing, agriculture, and banking 
which make the United States, the United Kingdom, and France wealthy 
countries. However, Saudi Arabia has a high current income, which 
categorizes it as a wealthy nation. But this wealth is generated 
mainly from one source, namely: the oil industry. So, Saudi Arabia 
possesses the financial resources (per capita income of $15,700), but 
does not have the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures in the 
immediate past nor to project them into the near future. Therefore, the 
characteristics of the budgetary process in Saudi Arabia differ from 
those in poor countries (those without money) and in rich countries 
which are certain about their budgets. 
The purpose of the study is to examine empirically the character­
istics of the governmental budgeting process in which the environment 
is uncertain but where the government is rich. 
13Ibid., p. 11. 
Statement of the Problem 
10 
What are the characteristics of the governmental budgeting 
process when the government is rich but the environment is uncertain? 
To facilitate the investigation of this question, the study is organ­
ized into the following four phases. 
Phase I 
The existing theoretical explanations of the governmental 
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing environ­
ment within that country are examined. 
Phase II 
Those empirical works are reviewed that deal with the character­
istics of budgetary processes in the first three classes of budgetary 
environments, namely: RCE, PCE and PUE. 
Phase III 
The characteristics of the budgetary process in rich and uncer­
tain environment are examined empirically. This phase involves the 
following stages: 
Stage 1 
A description and analysis of the role of the major parti­
cipants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process; 
Stage 2 
An empirical examination of the characteristics of Saudi 
Arabian governmental budgetary process; 
Stage 3 
The development of preliminary recommendations for the 
11 
improvement of the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
Phase IV 
The characteristics of the budgetary processes in rich and 
uncertain environment are compared with the other three classes of 
budgetary environments. 
As shown in Figure 2, some of these phases have been investi­
gated by previous researchers. Others will be examined by this study. 
Justifications and Contributions 
of the Study 
The last decade has witnessed an increasing interest in the 
accounting for not-for-profit (NFP) organizations. The American 
Accounting Association (AAA), through its difference committees, has 
issued several reports related to NFP accounting theory. The American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), through the Finan­
cial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and the Auditing Committees, has 
issued sundry NFP accounting and auditing guides. Furthermore, FASB, 
with the cooperation of the National Committee on Governmental Account­
ing, has moved toward establishing pragmatic accounting standards for 
14 NFP organizations. In spite of the developments in the last decade, 
14 For examples, please see: Committee on Accounting for Not-For-
Profit Organizations, The Accounting Review (Supplement to Vol. 46 
(1971), pp. 81-164; Committee on Nonfinancial Measures of Effective­
ness, The Accounting Review (Supplement to Vol. 46 (1971), pp. 165-212; 
Committee on Measures of Effect for Social Programs, The Accounting 
Review (Supplement to Vol. 47 (1972), pp. 337-398; Committee on Not-For-
Profit Organizations (1972-1973), The Accounting Review (Supplement to 
Vol. 49 (1974), pp. 225-249; Robert A. Anthony, Financial Accounting in 
Nonbusiness Organizations: An Exploratory Study of Conceptual Issues, 
May 1978. 
Figure 2. 
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13 
the accounting for NFP organizations is still a neglected area in 
accounting literature. 
Accounting for NFP organizations could be categorized as 
"business-type" or "government-type." The activities of these types 
have been defined by AAA Committee on Accounting for not-for-profit 
organizations as: 
"Business type activities are those that are 
intended to be self-supporting (or largely so) 
through time. Though the capital required to 
establish or expand such activities may be pro­
vided in various manners; e.g., by donation, 
grant, general debt issue, or intraunit transfer -
their routine operations, at least are financed 
through consumer or user charges government-
type activities are those typically associated 
with the "general government" or other not-for-
profit purposes and objectives of the unit."-^ 
The Accounting for Business type is more fully developed than the gov­
ernment type. This phenomonen could be attributable to the resemblance 
of the business type to profit-oriented organizations. Traditionally, 
budgets or budgeting has been investigated in accounting literature 
within the business environment. This practice could be based on the 
assumption that generalizations about budgeting can be formulated to 
apply to both public and private spheres. Dahl and Lindblom have main­
tained the position that there is a continuum or continuums between 
16 
public and private agencies. This study takes the position that 
budgeting in the governmental sphere should be studied separately for 
"'"^Committee on Accounting for Not-For-Profit Organizations (1972-
1973), p. 225. 
"^Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, 
and Welfare (N.Y.: Harper and Bros., 1953), pp. 6-18. 
14 
the following reasons: 
First, the environment of the business would contain elements 
that have no counterparts in the environment of most public sectors. 
Second, the pervasive notion in the existing literature is that 
budgeting or budgets play a greater role in the public sphere than in 
the private sphere. This notion is attributable to the nature of 
government environment. The amount of resources available for govern­
ment is bound only by the sum of all resources in the society. On the 
other hand, the private sector is constrained by a relatively fixed set 
of available resources. Also, private sector activities are character­
ized by the profit motive, while government activities are not. There­
fore, governmental budgets have become a method to communicate govern­
ment endeavors to all citizens. 
Third, understanding the governmental budget is essential to 
government accountants in order to provide public administrators with 
^the relevant information for decision making. This point could be 
illustrated by Ball's recent article on government accounting: 
"....The government accountant is providing infor­
mation for public administrators within a political 
context. Adequate functioning in this area pre­
supposes a knowledge of the conduct of public 
administration and some understanding of political 
behavior. There is, for instance, a substantial 
body of literature explaining the behavior of 
various groups within the budgetary process in 
government. This examines alternative strategies 
adapted by departments and the response of the 
Treasury and of the Government. If an accountant 
is to be involved in the budgetary process in 
government, such knowledge would seem to be 
essential to him as is literature which examines 
15 
the mentioned aspects of standard-setting in 
the private sector. 
Fourth, budgetary practices are clearly accounting and must be 
performed by the profession; otherwise the quality and credibility of 
18 thie data accumulated, analyzed, and used suffer. 
The study of governmental budgeting is a study in behavioral and 
governmental accounting. The economy of a country is greatly influenced 
by the budgetary actions of that country's government. Governmental 
budgeting is the major process through which the planning and control­
ling of public resources are determined. Comprehensive planning provides 
guidance for the allocation of economic resources. Budgetary activity 
enables the plan for the public sector to be directly implemented, while 
through a system of incentives and disincentives, budgetary activities 
indirectly influence private consumption, savings, and investments. 
Written budget proposals are essential to communications, discussions, 
revisions, and documentation of plans by those concerned with and 
responsible for the planning. Also, governmental budgeting is widely 
used as a control device. The budget enables the departments and chief 
executives to keep the expenditures within the limitations imposed by 
the Legislatures. Finally, the budget is used for the purpose of the 
19 
evaluation of the effectiveness of governmental programs. The first 
"^Lan Ball, "Government Accounting," Accountants Journal, February 
1979, pp. 12-14. 
18 
David F. Linowes, "Social Responsibility of the Profession," 
The Journal of Accountancy, January 1971, pp. 66-69. 
19 
Edward Lynn, and Robert Freeman, Fund Accounting Theory and 
Practice (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), 
p. 59. 
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step in fulfilling these functions is to understand the budgetary 
process itself and to apply its characteristics in order to make it 
function effectively. 
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the charac­
teristics of the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments 
and to compare the characteristics of this process with those of the 
other three classes, the results of this study should contribute toward 
constructing a theory of governmental budgeting. Moreover, it is hoped 
that this study will fill a gap in the literature of governmental 
accounting. 
Because of the continuous and rapid increase in Saudi Arabian 
governmental activities, the decision-making process has become very 
complex. Consequently, relevant information is more essential now than 
ever before for anticipating the most desirable results of any decision. 
Such information is not generated by the traditional Saudi Arabian 
20 budgetary process. So, an auxiliary contribution of this study is to 
evolve recommendations which may help in improving the governmental 
budgetary process in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the results of this 
study will be useful to accounting practitioners and educators in rich 
and uncertain countries in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although the purpose of this study is to investigate the charac­
teristics of the governmental budgetary processes in rich and uncertain 
20 
M. Amry, Program Budgeting Model for Saudi Arabian Elementary 
Education: An Emphasis on Program Costs. (Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta­
tion, The Accounting Department, University of Arizona, 1976), p. 4. 
J\i. 
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environments, the study will be limited to the Saudi Arabian govern­
mental budgetary process. The reason for this limitation is because 
of the unavailability of data except for data available from the 
records of the Saudi Arabian government. 
This study will be limited to the opinions of those interviewed 
in the study sample, the various budget participants. The study was 
made possible through the cooperation of the Ministry of Finance and 
other government organizations of the Saudi Arabian government. 
Scope and Organization of the Study 
This study contains five chapters - Introduction, Literature 
Review, Methodology, Results, Summary and Conclusion. The first 
chapter - The Introduction - includes the purpose of the study, the 
statement of the problem, the justification and the contributions of 
the study, limitations of the study, and the organization of the study. 
In order to furnish a background for this study, the second 
chapter provides a review of the related literature. In particular, 
this chapter discusses the theory that explains the governmental 
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing environ­
ment within that country, summarizes the major budgetary reforms in 
governmental budgetary process with emphasis on the rich and certain 
environments, and reviews the major empirical contributions in the 
three classes of budgetary process. 
The third chapter states the research hypotheses and outlines the 
methodology. The fourth chapter details the empirical research. The 
Summary, conclusions, and recommendations are stated in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Governmental Budgetary Process: Historical Development 
The main objectives of reviewing the historical development of 
the governmental budget are twofold: 
1. To provide the accounting profession and academia with a 
synopsis review of the recent development in governmental "budgetary 
process with emphasis on the major reforms in rich and certain 
environments. 
2. To compare the governmental budgetary reforms in Saudi Arabia 
with other reforms in othet countries as well as to furnish a basis 
for the study recommendations. 
A substantial part of governmental budget literature is con­
cerned with reforms. The need for better budgeting is the princiapl 
reason for this concentration. Governmental budget reforms in the 
United States of America - resembling RCE have passed through three 
different stages of development: control-oriented, management-oriented, 
and planning-oriented. In the first stage, dating roughly from 1920-
1935, the dominant emphasis was on accountability. In the second 
stage, dating roughly between the 1930's and the 1960's, the emphasis 
was on efficiency in the government. The final stage, which occured 
during the 60's and 70's, emphasized the multipurpose budget system. 
18 
19 
(1) The Era of Fiscal Control (Input Cost) 
Traditionally, governmental budgeting all over the world begins 
with indispensable efforts to promote "accountability" by emphasizing 
the control over administrative spending abuses. In other words, the 
budget has been considered primarily a financial and accounting device, 
in which input cost is the major feature of the budget. The means of 
achieving tight control over input costs was to appropriate by line item, 
or object of expenditure,rather than upon the accomplishments of govern­
mental activities."'" 
A unified national budget was the first major reform in this 
era. In the United States, the first decade of the twentieth century 
witnessed the struggle to establish a unified national budget. Up to 
that time, the United States budget was simply a compilation of depart­
mental requests for funds. Most writers credited the changes in eco­
nomic conditions for this reform. Others believe that the success of 
local governmental experiences with a unified budget, such as in New 
York and Ohio, was the major factor for prompting the national unified 
budget idea. The Taft Commission (1912) recommended the need for a 
national budget, but it was not until the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921 that the new federal system was established. This system involves 
establishing a national unified budget with new forms of auditing and 
2 
control. Also, the system involves a standard periodic budget cycle. 
The unified national budget was also the major reform in other countries. 
"'"Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting," Public Administra­
tion Review (March/April, 1969), p. 117. 
2 
Robert D. Lee and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting System 
(Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975), p. 8. 
20 
For example, the English Consolidated Fund Act of 1787 established a 
complete account of revenue and expenditure. In France, the budgetary 
3 
system was established in 1831. 
The second major reform in this era was the "balanced budget," 
Balanced budget was considered to be the core principle in good fiscal 
policy. Gross stated that the reason for this belief is that it 
provides a "hard-nosed" criterion for decision making by budget 
4 
rationalists. 
The other reforms in this era can be categorized as additions 
to the financial audit activities and to the centralization of budget 
preparation. Those reforms were used to insure that money had in fact 
been spent for the item authorized in the budget. 
Theoretically, the majority of the writers in the early part of 
this century criticized the budgetary system which focuses on input 
cost. They regarded input cost as subsidiary data, to be included for 
informational purposes only. Instead, they promoted the budgetary 
system which is based on functional classifications. This system would 
focus on the work to be accomplished.The Taft Commission in Economy 
and Efficiency (1912) is the best example of a proponent of the func­
tional classification system which focuses on program results instead of 
fiscal control. Other examples of the proponents of program results 
can be seen in the writings of Fredrick A. Cleveland (1910), Paul T. 
3 Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: Wiley, 1965), 
p. 7. 
^Bertram M. Gross, "The New System Budgeting, p. 118. 
Allen Walker Steiss, Budgeting and Management (Lexington: 
Massachusetts, Lexington, 1972), p. 150. 
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Besser (1915), William F. Willoughby (1918), and Lent D, Upson (1924).^ 
According to Steiss, most of the early efforts to develop func­
tional classification were relatively unsuccessful. The reason for 
their failure was that functional classification did not provide 
adequate protection against administrative improprieties.^ 
(2) The Management Orientation (Input related to Output) 
The second stage of budget reforms was initiated to affect the 
problems of fiscal control reforms. This stage is characterized as 
management orientation. The major emphasis was on the efficiency with 
which ongoing activities were conducted. In other words, this stage 
was concerned with efficiency instead of fiscal control in the govern­
ment. According to Gross, the idea behind this movement was that any 
government agency should know what it has done, is doing, or wants to 
do with the inputs it uses.^ 
In the United States, the management orientation stage was 
officially inaugurated by the 1949 Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government, known as the First Hoover Commission. 
The Commission recommended that the federal budget be "based upon 
function, activities, and projects." This recommendation is best known 
as "performance budget." The Commission report stated: 
"....We recommend that the whole budgetary concept 
of the federal government should be refashioned by 
the adoption of a budget based upon functions, activ­
ities, and projects; this we designate a performance 
budget. Such an approach would focus attention upon 
g 
Lee and Johnson, Public Budgeting System, p. 103. 
^Steiss, Budgeting and Management, p. 151. 
O 
Gross, "The New System Budgeting," p. 119. 
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the general character and relative importance 
of the work to be done, or upon the service 
to be rendered, rather than upon the things to 
be acquired, such as personal services, supplies, 
equipment, etc. These latter objects are, after 
all, only the means to an end. The all important 
thing in budgeting is the work or the service to 
be accomplished, and what the work or service 
will cost."9 
Although performance budget had numerous theoretical appeals, 
practically it faced numerous problems. And by the early sixties, the 
performance budget movement had begun to slow down. Some authors 
believe that performance budget failed because it required a large 
amount of data without establishing an adequate information system. 
Others attribute its failure to the negligence of middle managment. 
Gross attributed the failure of performance budget to the following 
10 
reasons: 
(a) The Hoover Commission failed to recognize the greater ease 
of output, identification, measurement, and costing in programs 
associated with hard goods. 
(b) Governmental budget areas failed to focus on the problem 
of intangible output. 
(c) Costing was both incomplete and clumsy. 
(3) Multipurpose Budget Systems 
The 1960's and 19 70's witnessed significant budgetary reforms. 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) caught the attention of 
the reformers, but by the early 1970's it lost much of its luster. 
9 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern­
ment, Budgeting and Accounting (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1949), p. 8. 
"^Gross, "The New System Budgeting," p. 120. 
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Then Management by Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) were 
introduced as alternatives to the controversial PPB System. 
(A) PPB System 
Much has been written about PPBS, but there is no complete 
agreement in the literature as to what PPBS is. This could be attri­
buted to the circumstances surrounding the PPB development and imple­
mentation process in a real and specific organization.^ Wildavsky 
defines PPBS as: 
"....Program budgeting has no standard definition. 
The general idea is that budgetary decision should 
be made by focusing on output categories like 
governmental goals, objectives, and products or 
programs instead of inputs like personnel, equip­
ment, and maintenance. As in cost-benefit analysis, 
to which it iwes a greal deal, program budgeting 
lays stress on estimating the total financial cost 
of accomplishing objectives."12 
David Novick, as the father of PPBS, considers PPBS to be a 
13 
management system with the following features: 
(1) Definition of objectives 
(2) Determination of programs 
(3) Assignment of activities to programs 
(4) Establishment of plan/program budget role 
(5) Development of cost/benefit methods 
(6) Identification and evaluation of alternatives 
"'""'"M. Amry, "Program Budgeting Model for Saudi Arabian Elementary 
Education: An Emphasis on Program Cost," p. 39. 
12 
Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost 
Benefit Analysis, System Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public 
Administration Review 26 (December 1966), p. 302. 
13 
David Novick, Current Practice in Program Budgeting (New York: 
Grane Russak, 1973), p. 5. 
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(7) Development, and application of criteria 
(8) Use of existing reporting system 
(9) Updating of programs 
Gross pointed out that most proponents and defenders of PPB 
are in agreement about what PPBS is not: 
It is not dependent upon right mathematical models 
of computed calculation. 
It is not a system for replacing human judgment. 
- It does not deal directly with such sector-proportion 
questions as the relative emphasis placed upon health 
vs. education, transportation vs. communications, or 
military vs. civilian expenditures.14 
In summary, the main thrust of the PPB System is to introduce 
analysis in the governmental budgetary process and thereby to improve 
policy making. The majority of the industrial nations have experienced 
the PPB System in one form or another. In the United States, the 
experience with planning in budgeting goes back to the first of this 
century. Planning in budgeting was first implemented in the Borough 
of Richman, New York City, for the period 1912 - lyl5. The concepts 
were also tried for a short period of time in the Agricultural Depart­
ment during the 1930's.^ 
PPB System was implemented officially in the civilian agencies 
in August 1965, when President Johnson announced that all federal 
agencies should implement program budgeting (PB). The Program and 
Financial Plan (PFP) is the major component of the civilian system. 
Changes in the PFP were made through Program Memoranda (PMs) and special 
14 Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting," pp. 115-116. 
^Lee and Johnson, Public Budgeting System, p. 106. 
J
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Analytical Studies (SASs). By June 21, 1971, the PPB System in 
civilian agencies was officially abandoned. The PPB System was also 
tried in some state and local governments, but few states have achiev­
ed considerable progress."^ 
Schick in his famous article "Death in the Bureaucracy" out-
17 lined the causes of the PPB System failures in the United States as: 
(1) The manner in which they were introduced, across-the-board 
and without much preparation. 
(2) The insensitivity of new men of power to budgetary tradi­
tions, institutional loyalties, and personal relations. 
(3) Inadequate support and leadership. 
(4) Inadequate supply of good analysts and data. 
Schick observed that: 
"Even if the leadership, data, analytical 
capability, resources and support, interpersonal 
and institutional sensitivity, and all of the 
factors which worked against PPB had been 
favorable, there still would have been the 
anti-analytical thrust of the budgetary process 
to contend with."18 
The roots of the PPB System in the United Kingdom go back to the 
middle 1950's. But it was not until October, 1970, that the Reorgani­
zation of Central Government declared the establishment of PPB in 
governmental budgetary process. 
The English system consists of three documents. 
(1) The Public Expenditure Survey (PES) provides broad alloca­
tion of the public resources and established priorities within 
16Ibid., pp. 12-47. 
Allen Schick, "Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal 
PPB," Public Administration Review (March/April 1973), pp. 148-149. 
lsIbid., p. 148. 
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these resources in a systematic and comprehensive manner. 
(2) Program Analyses and Review (PAR) provides a penetrating 
analysis of the purposes intended to be served by the programs 
and of their effectiveness in the light of alternatives. 
(3) Central Policy Review Statement (CPRS) assures an overall 
19 
coherence with government policy. 
In France, the "rationalization of budget choices," "rational­
ization des choix budgetaires" (RCP), was officially adopted at the 
beginning of 1968. The RCB meant the adoption within the administration 
of a coherent approach to the preparation, execution, and control of ' 
20 decisions at each level of responsibility. 
Australia, Canada, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, and Austria have 
incorporated some features of PPBS into the budgetary process, but in 
general these efforts have faced the same problems as in the United 
21 States. 
(B) Other Budget Reforms 
By the mid 1970's, the PPB System movement was sluggish, and 
other systems were introduced in order to improve the governmental 
budgetary process. In the United States, Management by Objectives 
(MBO) and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) were the major contemporary budget 
reforms. 
The main theme of MBO is the setting out of specific objectives 
19 Werner Z. Hirsch, "Program Budgeting in the United Kingdom," 
Public Administration Review (March/April 1973), pp. 120-128. 
20 
Philippe Huet, "The Rationalization of Budget Choices in France," 
Public Administration (London, Autumn 1970), pp. 273-286. 
21 Novick, "Current Practice in Program Budgeting," pp. 69-125. 
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for agencies and requiring high level periodic reports on the progress 
toward achieving these objectives. MBO was first introduced at the 
beginning of the second term of the Nixon administration. MBO, unlike 
PPBS, was not done through regulations, but it was encouraged strongly 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Even though the MBO was 
short-lived and died with the Nixon administration, it improved many 
22 departmental budget procedures. 
Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) has its roots in the private and 
public sector. Much of the literature dealing with ZBB focuses on 
defining it and describing its procedures. In general, the main theme 
of ZBB is constructing a budget without any reference to what has gone 
before. In other words, the current spending level is not regarded as 
an inviolate base. 
ZBB is considered a new budget reform but its spirit goes back 
to the industrial revolution. The U. S. Department of Agriculture used 
ZBB in 1964 for a short period of time. The application of such budget­
ing was abandoned because it was considered expensive and time consum­
ing. The concept was resurrected in the private sector at the beginning 
of the 1970's. Peter A. Pyhrr used it successfully in Texas Instruments. 
Since then, the popularity of the concept has been widespread. Accord­
ing to Barton and Waldron, over one hundred companies have embraced the 
23 
concept of ZBB including Allied Van Lines, Westinghouse, and Zerox. 
The main purpose of the adoption of the concept in the private sector 
22 Thomas D. Lynch, Public Budgeting in America (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: 1979), p. 5. 
23 Frank Barton, Jr., and Darryl G. Waldron, "Zero-Based Budgeting: 
Is It New, or Unique?," "The Woman CPA" (January 1979), pp. 15-16. 
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was to control overhead activities. In the public sector, the concept 
was also resurrected by Jimmy Carter in the State of Georgia, and his 
example was followed by other states. In the federal government, ZBB 
was implemented by President Carter in the fiscal 1979 budget. 
The Theory of Governmental Budgetary Process 
Since the early part of this century, scholars in governmental 
budget have called for a general budget theory or a normative theory 
regardless of the budgetary environment. Writing in 1940, V. 0. Key 
saw the basic budgetary problem focused around the question of: 
"On what basis shall it be decided to allocate X dollars to activity A 
instead of B?" Key continued, "The completed budgetary document repre­
sents a judgement upon how scarce means should be allocated to bring 
24 
the maximum return in social utility." The main thrust of Key's 
article was to call for a general theory that would help in deciding 
the merits of various requests for scarce resources. Since this art­
icle, several attempts have been made to meet Key's challenge. 
Examples of these attempts can be found in the writings of Verne B. 
Lewis, Arther Simithies, Paul A. Samuelson, Herbert S. Mitchell, Harry 
25 
Hardy and John Callon. 
24 
Key, "The Lack of Budgetary Theory," p. 1138. 
25 See: Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1952), pp. 43-54; Paul A. 
Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exponition of Theory of Public Expenditures," 
Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1955); Herbert S. Mitch­
ell, School of Budget Policies for Financial Control (Danville, Ill­
inois: The Interstate School Accounting Series, 1962); and Harry Hardy 
and John F. Callon, Program Planning for State, County, City (Washing­
ton University, 1967). 
29 
Verne B. Lewis (1952) agreed with Key's notion and attempted 
the construction of a normative economic theory of budgeting. He 
26 
suggested three propositions: 
(1) The economic test, which specifies that the return from every 
expenditure must be worth its cost in terms of sacrificed alter­
natives, must be applied in choosing among comparative alterna­
tives . 
(2) When additional expenditure for any purpose yields the same 
return, incremental analysis becomes necessary and useful in 
budget decision making. 
(3) The relative merit of different programs can be compared in 
terms of relative effectiveness in achieving common objectives. 
Another attempt to construct normative budgetary theory can be 
found in the suggestions of Hardy and Gallon (1967). They stressed the 
need to compare alternative programs and their costs and the use of 
27 
marginal utility as a tool in comparing comparative programs. 
Although the above scholars' attempts to construct a normative 
budgetary theory have significant logical justifications, their attempts 
have been unsuccessful so far. The reason for this failure is the 
emphasis on the development of ideal criteria for optimum resource 
allocation without consideration of the real environments. In this 
context, Wildavsky argued that trying to develop a normative theory 
which emphasizes how to allocate scarce resources to alternative 
26 
Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," p. 43. 
27 
Wildavsky, The Politics of Budgetary Process, pp. 131-132. 
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purposes, is "a tantamount" to a theory of how the government should 
act in every particular situation. Wildavsky observed 
"....A theory that contains criteria for deter­
mining what ought to be in the budget is nothing 
less than a theory stating what the government 
ought to do, it becomes clear that a normative 
theory of budgeting would be a comprehensive and 
specific political theory detailing what the govern­
ment activities ought to be at a particular time. 
A normative theory of budgeting, its accomplishment 
and acceptance would mean the end of conflict over 
the government's role in society."28 
As an alternative to the normative theory, Wildavsky suggested 
the development of a descriptive budgetary theory. Such a theory 
involves empirical research in how budgeting actually happens in a 
specific environment. Wildavsky argued: 
"....The point is that until we develop more 
adequate descriptive theory about budgeting, until 
we know something about existing situations in 
which the participants find themselves under our 
political system, proposals for major reform must 
be based on awfully inadequate understanding."29 
Wildavsky's view has promoted empirical research in the reality 
of doing the budget. The major contribution of this body of research 
has been the development of descriptive models to guide the decision 
30 
making process in a given budgetary environment. Theoretically, the 
28 
Wildavsky, The Politics of Budgetary Process, pp. 131-132. 
29 
Aaron Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budgeting Reforms," 
Public Administration Reviews 
30 See for examples: Thomas Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Deter­
mination of State Budget," Midwest Journal of Political Science (Febru­
ary 1967), pp. 27-43; Richard Fenno, "The Power of the Purse"(Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1966); John Crecine, Government Problem Solving: 
A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1969); Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and 
Budget Success in State Legislatures," American Political Science Review 
(December 1968), pp. ]220-31; Otto Davis, H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildav­
sky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science 
Review (September 1968), pp. 529-547; and John Wanat, "Basis of Budget­
ary Incrementation," American Political Science Review (September 1974), 
pp. 1223-28. 
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manner in which budget decisions are made, or "should be" made 
(The budget decision models), has created a substantial controversy 
in budget literature. At one extreme is the rational comprehensive 
model; at the other extreme is the incremental model. Between the two 
extremes are the sacrificing and stages problem-solving models. These 
models can be visualized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
The sacrificing model 
The incremental change model The rational comprehensive model 
The stage problem solving model 
Continuum of Budget Decision Making Models 
1. Rational Comprehensive Model 
The decision making models vary according to their assumptions 
about the objectives of decision making and the capacity to utilize 
9 '  
information. The underlying assumption of the comprehensive model, as 
the name implies, is the utilization of scientific procedures in budget 
decision making. The scientific procedures involve performing a series 
of ordered and logical steps in making a particular decision. Qften-
. * 31 
cited steps are: 
(1) Specify a complete set of an organization's goals. 
(2) Rank those goals in priority order. 
31 
John Wanat, Introduction to Budgeting (North Scitute: Massachu­
setts, Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 112. 
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(3) Identify all possible alternatives. 
(4) Determine the cost and benefit of each alternative. 
(5) Calculate the probability of occurrence of each action. 
(6) Compare the possible alternatives on the basis of 
cost/benefit and their probability of occurrence. 
The rational model requires a perfect determination of goals, 
the optimum knowledge of all alternatives, the calculation of specific 
costs and benefits, and scientific processes in selecting among compet­
ing alternatives. Even though these requirements appear to be ideal 
and logical procedures for decision making, their applicability in 
governmental budgeting is limited. In fact, the capability to meet 
even one of these requirements is non-existent in any government. So, 
the comprehensive model is based on an ideal environment and ignores the 
real world situation. This shortcoming is the core criticism of the 
comprehensive model. In this context, Lindblom criticized the compre­
hensive model of decision making on the grounds that it involves many 
problems, namely: 
(1) Impossibility of specifying the goals of society. 
(2) Impracticability of researching all possible alternatives. 
(3) Nonfeasibility of choosing the appropriate criterion for 
selecting the "best" alternative. 
Lindblom attributed the existence of these problems to the limits of 
human intellectual capacities and to a scarcity of available informa­
tion. These limits lessen man's capacity to be comprehensive. Also, 
politics limit the power of the decision maker. Furthermore, the cost 
of generating perfect information and of determining scientific 
33 
analysis is tremendous. Finally, the limitations of time hinder com-
32 
prehensive analysis. 
In the same line of thought, Wildavsky attacked the comprehen­
sive model on the grounds that it does not represent the real environ­
ment of budget decision making. He stressed that most budget decisions 
are politically motivated and that they are not based on pure rational-
33 ization like the comprehensive model. 
2. Increment Model 
At the other extreme of the budgetary decision making continuum 
is the incremental model or "muddling through." This model was intro­
duced by the critics of the comprehensive model, such as Lindblom, 
Dahl, Wildavsky, and others. Dahl and Lindblom define incrementalism 
as: 
"....a method of social action that takes exist­
ing reality as one alternative and compares the 
probable gains and losses of closely related 
alternatives by making relatively small adjust­
ments about whose consequences approximately as 
much is known as about the consequences of the 
existing reality. 
Wildavsky defines the incremental model as follows: 
* "....Budgeting is incremental, not comprehen­
sive. The beginning of wisdom about an agency 
budget is that it is almost never actively reviewed 
as a whole every year in the sense of reconsidering 
the value of all existing programs as compared to 
all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on 
32 
Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling' Through," Public 
Administration Review (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88. 
33 
Wildavsky, "The Politics of the Budgetary Process," pp. 127-
180. 
34 
Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics and 
Welfare (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 53. 
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last year's budget with special attention 
given to a narrow range of increases or 
decreases. Thus, the men who make the budget 
are concerned with relatively small increments 
to an existing base. Their attention is 
focused on a small number of items over which 
the budgetary battle is fought."35 
The main feature of the incremental model, as these two defini­
tions illustrate, is the assumption that budgetary decisions are politi­
cal. These decisions are not made in a comprehensive and rational 
manner, but rather by a succession of incremental changes, "political 
bargain." The incremental model involves two important concepts: the 
base and the increment. The base or status quo means the present or the 
initial condition prior to the decision, while the increment means the 
portion that is only slightly different from the initial situation as a 
result of the decision. So, the decision maker, according to the 
incrementalism view, focuses only on marginal or incremental values. 
The justification for this assumption is based on the reality of budget 
decision making. Since the decision making involves various interest 
groups with conflicting goals and valued, these groups are expected to 
bargain for changes or at least to maintain the existing situation. 
The advocates of the incremental model stress the advantages of 
the model as a tool for budget decision making. Often-cited advantages 
36 
are: 
(1) Marginal adjustment can be judged on the basis of 
experience and reasonable prediction. 
(2) The decision making process is simplified. 
35 Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 15. 
36 Earl Elmore, "The South Carolina Budgetary Process; Managing the 
Muddle" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1978), 
p. 18. 
35 
(3) Social values will not be neglected since the decisions 
are normally agreed upon among interested parties. 
There are major differences between the comprehensive and 
incremental models. While the comprehensive model involves the process 
of optimization, the decisions in the incremental model are based only 
on the interest group's satisfaction. Also, all possible alternatives 
in the first model must be well identified; the alternatives in the 
second model are only marginally different from unsatisfactory situa­
tions. Moreover, the decisions in the first model are based to some 
37 degree on a consensus of all interested parties. 
3. Satisficing Model 
The satisficing and the stages of the problem-solving model are 
rarely discussed in the literature. The satisficing model involves the 
following steps, namely: 
(1) Developing a criterion to judge acceptable policy alter­
natives for a given problem. 
(2) Searching for the available alternatives. 
(3) Selecting the first discovered acceptable alternative. 
The major feature of the satisficing model is that it recognizes 
the time limitation which imposes upon the decision maker in the compre­
hensive model. So, as a practical solution, the decision maker chooses 
the first acceptable alternative. The main obstacle to this model is 
that the satisfaction stage is subject to judgment and difficult to 
achieve. 
37 
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4. A Stage Problem Solving Model 
The stage problem-solving model follows the same steps as 
38 
scientific, research methodology. 
(1) Recognizing the existence of specific problem. 
(2) Defining the problem. 
(3) Identifying all the possible alternatives. 
(4) Collecting the information 
(5) Testing the proposals. 
(6) Taking action and evaluating outcomes. 
The main difference between this model and the comprehensive 
model is that the comprehensive model is limited to deciding on a given 
matter based upon maximizing goals, while the stage of the problem-
39 
solving model is aimed toward solving a specific problem. 
Empirical Studies of the Governmental Budgetary Processes 
in a Given Environment 
A substantial part of the empirical researches in the government­
al budgetary process are concerned with constructing a descriptive model 
of the decision making in a given budgetary environment at a given 
period of time. In other words, the emphasis was on the description of 
empirical reality rather than on the theoretical or normative concerns. 
The purpose of this section is to review the major empirical studies in 
each of the three budgetary environments (rich/certain, poor/certain and 
poor/uncertain) . Paramount emphasis will be placed on those studies which 
38Ibid., p. 22. 
39Ibid., pp. 23-26. 
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introduced a new methodology or modified an existing one. 
1. Rich and Certain Environments (RCE) 
Wildavsky (1964) has studied, in detail, the governmental budget­
ary process in the United States at the federal level (resembling RCE). 
The main focus of this study was to analyze the behavior of the major 
participants in the budgetary process. By utilizing unstructured inter­
views, Wildavsky found that the budget officials need to simplify, satis­
fy, and rely on feedback to cope with the budget. He also found that 
the attitudes of the major participants are fairly stable across time. 
He supported this notion with examples of "the fair share" and "base" 
attitudes toward budgeting which are widely held and perhaps oftei 
utilized in the budgetary process. The "fair share" of a budget to an 
agency is that portion of the total departmental budget it should nor­
mally be expected to receive. An agency's "base" is that level of ex­
penditure which is not only currently received but can reasonably be 
expected to be received in the future. 
Wildavsky argued that not only a limited number of alternatives 
are considered in the agency's budget, but normally this budget involves 
relatively small adjustments from an existing base. To illustrate this 
argument, Wildavsky analyzed the range of variation on the percentage 
of increase or decrease of appropriations as compared to previous years 
(or the magnitude of change in budgetary appropriation) for 37 federal 
agencies over a 12-year period. He found that almost a third of 
these cases (149 out of 444) show modifications of 5 percent or less. 
Slightly more than half of the cases (233) are in the 10 percent 
bracket, and just under three quarters of the cases (326) occur 
within 30 percent. By using 0-30 percent as a criteria 
•H.. 
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a criteria to define increment process, Wildavsky concluded that the 
budgetary process in the United States at the federal level is incre­
mental and not a comprehensive process. Thus the budget participants 
are mainly concerned with relatively small increments to an existing 
i 40 base. 
Wildavsky's study has opened the door to the contemporary beha­
vioral budgetary research in the public sector. Since this important 
contribution, a number of empirical studies have been conducted in the 
federal, state, and municipal budgets in the United States and other 
countries. During the 1960's and 1970's, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 
published a series of studies which formalized, extended and empirically 
examined the incremental concept in the governmental budgetary processes 
41 in the United States at the federal level. In these series of studies, 
(1965, 1966, 1971, 1974) Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky explained 
federal budget behavior through linear regression models. Specifically, 
they constructed a series of mathematical models which represents sever­
al decision rules for both the requestors group and givers group. For 
each series of requests or appropriations, they selected that rule 
which most closely represented actual behavior. The purpose of choosing 
40 Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, pp. 14-15. 
41 Otto A. Davis, M. A. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of 
the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review (September 
1966), pp. 529-47. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, "On the Process of 
Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," Paper 
on the Non-Market Decision-Making, I (1965), pp. 63-132. Davis, Demp­
ster, and Wildavsky, "On the Process of Budgeting II: An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Appropriations," in Studies of Budgeting (Amster­
dam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 292-376. Davis, 
Dempster, and Wildavsky, "Toward a Predictive Theory of Government 
Expenditure: U. S. Domestic Appropriations," British Journal of Politi­
cal Science (October 1974), pp. 419-452. 
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the best model is to provide a theory which describes the actual 
methods used in making budgetary decisions in certain kinds of organ­
izations. Three decision models were proposed as representative of the 
behavioral rules for agency requests. One must be selected on the 
basis of which model accurately represents the behavior of. the request 
group. 
x t "  V t - i +  £  t  ( 1 >  
\ " ¥t-l " B2 (It-l " Xt-1» + (2> 
Xt • B3Xt-l + £ t (3> 
Where Y represents the appropriation granted by the appropriation 
committees for any given agency for Year X is the appropriation 
requested by any given agency for Year^; the averages or mean percent­
age are represented by Bo> B^, B^, respectively; and ^  is the incre­
ment or decrement due to circumstances. 
The first model (Equation #1) views the agency request for a 
certain year as a fixed mean percentage of the committee's appropria­
tion for that agency in the previous year plus a random variable (nor­
mally distributed with mean of zero and unknown but finite variance) 
for that year. The random variable ( £. ) represents the sum of the 
effects of all events, that is an increment or decrement to the usual 
percentage of the previous year's appropriation. This model is based 
on the assumption that the agency does not consider it desirable to 
make extraordinary requests which might be viewed with suspicion by the 
giver group. The second model (Equation #2) specifies that the agency 
request for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the committee's 
appropriation and the agency request for the previous year plus a 
*\j. 
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stochastic disturbance. This model is based on the assumption that the 
agency desires to smooth out its stream of appropriations by taking 
into account the difference between its request and appropriations for 
the previous year. The final model (Equation #3) specifies that the 
agency request for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the 
agency's request for the previous year plus a random variable. This mod­
el is based on the assumption that the appropriation committee has so 
much confidence in the agency that it tends to give an appropriation 
which is almost identical to the request. 
Also three models were proposed as representative to the 
behavioral rules for the appropriations committee. Again one must be 
selected on the basis of which model most accurately represents the 
behavior of the givers group in response to any agency request. 
Y T - A 0 X T + L T  < 4 >  
Yt " *1 Xt + Vt-1 + t (5) 
Y t - A 3 X t  +  \ +  \ + i t  <6) 
Where A^, A^, A^, A^, A^ are the fixed average percentages; i is the 
stochastic disturbance; c. is a stochastic disturbance representing 
that part of the appropriations attributed to the special circum­
stances; is a dummy variable which in year t represents: £ if 
equation (1) obtains, (Yfc ^ - X if equation (2) obtains, and 
if equation (3) obtains. 
The first model (Equation #4) specifies that the giver appropri­
ation for an agency in a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the 
agency's request in that year plus a stochastic disturbance. This 
41 
model is based on the assumption that an agency's request is relative­
ly a stable index of the funds needed by the agency to carry out its 
program. The second model (Equation #5) specifies that the giver 
group appropriation for an agency is a fixed mean percentage of the 
agency's request for that year plus a stochastic disturbance represent­
ing a deviation from the usual relationship between the giver and the 
agency in the previous year plus a random variable for current year. 
This model is based on the assumption that the giver group denotes from 
the fixed mean (usual percentage) due to the suspicion that the agency 
is padding the current year request. The third model (Equation #6) 
specifies that the giver group appropriation for an agency is a fixed 
mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus a 
fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus 
a fixed mean percentage of dummy variable plus random variable. This 
model is based on the assumption that some members of the giver group 
have intimate knowledge of the budgetary process of the agency. 
In order to choose the best model which resembles the behavior of 
the requestor and giver groups, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky studied 
times series data for the period 1947-1963 for fifty-six non-defense 
agencies of the United States government. The major findings of these 
studies show that: 
(1) The budgetary process of the United States government is 
equivalent to a set of temporarily stable decision rules. 
(2) The most popular combinations of behavior are the simple 
ones represented by Equation #1 for the requestor group and #4 
for the giver group. 
•SJ. 
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(3) When the giver group was a sophisticated strategy such as 
Equation #5 or #6, the requestor group tends to use the simple 
strategy represented by Equation #1. 
(4) When the giver group grants exactly the amount requested, 
the requestor group tends to use more sophisticated strategy 
represented by Equation #3. 
Obviously these findings show that the budgetary process in the 
United States government can be characterized as an incremental process 
where this year's decisions basically rely on last year's decisions. In 
addition, the budget participants use simple original maneuvers; 
furthermore, these findings show that the behavior of the budgetary 
process follows quite a simple law despite the agreement on complexity. 
Sharkansky (1965) studied the budgetary processes of the agencies 
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. He 
observed the variations in the agencies' budget strategies in this 
Department. So, he developed a model to explain these strategic differ­
entiations. Although this study ruled out the plausibility of common 
strategical behavior among the different agencies, it confirmed the 
previous studies' conclusion that the budgetary process at the United 
42 States federal level is incremental in nature. 
Fenno (1966) analyzed 576 congressional appropriations for the 
period 1947-1962. He used two measures of change in the federal budget: 
(1) the relationships between agencies requests and Congressional 
Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommit-
tie: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science (August 1965), pp. 254-5. 
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appropriations, and (2) the change in appropriations granted to a given 
agency from one year to the next. The findings of this study' supported 
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's conclusion, and stressed the fact that 
budgetary process at the federal level could be characterized as an 
incremental process.^ 
Natchez and Bupp (1973) investigated the governmental budgetary 
process of the Atomic Energy Commission. The unit of analysis was the 
program level instead of the whole agency budget. While they concurred 
with the previous researchers that the budgetary process is incremental 
for the entire agency's budget, they noticed the disappearance of 
44 incrementalism at the program level. 
Wanat (1974) drew a line between descriptive and explanatory 
incrementalism. He pointed out that for a phenomenon to be descrip­
tively incremental, changes in the system have only to be marginally 
different from status quo. But for a phenomenon to be explained by 
incrementalism, reasons must be given for the marginality of change. 
So, he criticized the Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky models on the 
grounds that the models concentrated on the descriptive rather than ex­
planatory incrementalism. In order to explain the incremental increase 
on budget requests and the restriction of cuts to those requested incre­
ments , Wanat examined all general fund line-items in the regular Labor 
Department budget for the period 1968-1972. He found that the distinction 
between mandatory and incremental requests and the differential treatment 
43 
Fenno, The Power of the Purse. 
44 Peter B. Natchez and Irvin Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the 
Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review (September 1973), 
pp. 951-63. 
•N#,. 
44 
of those tvo kinds of requests by Congress was a good explanation of 
the incremental changes in requests and appropriations. In a later 
study, Wanat (1976) showed that the use of personnel in studying budget 
relations yielded results different from those obtained by using 
dollars data. In this study he analyzed data from the budget exper­
ience of twelve domestic federal agencies in the 1950s and 1960s. He 
found that the correlation between the dollar requests and appropria­
tions were uniformly high. But the correlation between personnel 
requested and personnel allowed for the same agencies were generally 
lower than the comparable correlations on dollar data. He concluded 
that when inflationary forces and some of the mandated increases are 
removed, Congress acted more independently of agency requests than in 
45 
the dollar data. 
Wildavsky (1975) observed that incrementalism is becoming insti­
tutionalized in other rich nations. For example, in France the Parlia­
ment votes only on additions or subtractions from past totals and the 
Ministry of Finance treats past commitments as if they were inviolable. 
In England a new budgetary procedure has been adopted to make it more 
difficult for old items to be taken out of the existing base. Incre­
mentalism is also practiced in Japan. The Ministry of Finance imposes 
a 125 percent ceiling over the past year and the majority of the budget-
A-6 
ary decisions are concentrated to this increment. 
45 John Wanat, "Bases of Budgetary Incrementalism," pp. 1221-8, and 
"Personnel Measures of Budgetary Interaction,11 Western Political Quar­
terly (June 1976), pp. 29 5-7. 
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Processes, pp. 216-19. 
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Based on the empirical researches in RCE, Wildavsky (1975) 
summarized the characteristics of the budgetary process as well as 
47 
the behavior of the participants in this environment as: 
(1) The budgetary process in these countries classified as 
RCE is incremental in nature where past decisions serve as 
bases from which future expenditures are determined. Thus, 
the budgetary participants are concerned mainly with the 
changes from the existing base. 
(2) The participants in this environment use modest amount of 
strategic activities, since the relationships between then are 
highly determined and any gross departures from this expecta­
tion are easy to discover. 
(3) The budgetary process in this environment is the simplest 
in calculation comparing to other environments. Rich and 
certain nations generally budget by increments (last year plus 
or minus a certain percentage) so, the administrative agencies 
in these environments request certain funds with this relation­
ship in mind. The central organ acts almost in the same manner-
Hence, the budgetary process is very simple compared to the 
other environments. 
II. Poor and Certain Environments (PCE) 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the governmental 
budgetary processes at the local level resembling (PCE). Anton 
investigated the governmental budgetary processes of three cities 
in Illinois. He found that in each of the cities, agency heads 
47Ibid., pp. 203-219. 
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are instructed to base their spending requests on the estimated avail­
ability of revenue. So, the first step in formulating the city budget 
is to determine how much money will be available, rather than how much 
will have to be spent. Anton concluded that revenue constraint is the 
48 
major feature of the budgetary process at the local level. 
Barber (1966), in laboratory experiments, examined the govern­
mental budgetary process of twelve boards of finance in Connecticut. 
He noticed the lack of comprehensiveness in the boards" decisions. 
Instead they relied on simplified techniques and criteria. 
Crecine (1969), in a computer simulation technique, analyzed the 
budgetary process of three metropolitan governments (Pittsburgh, 
Detroit, and Cleveland). He concurred with Anton that the key feature 
of municipal budgeting is that the budget must be balanced to meet the 
revenue constraint. Also, this revenue constraint governs the behavior 
49 
of the major participants in the budgetary process. 
Caputo (1970), by utilizing open end interview format, studied 
the behavior of the major participants at various stages of the budget­
ary process in four medium-size cities (Midfora and Bridgeport, Connec­
ticut; and Chicapee and Springfield, Massachusetts). One of the main 
conclusions of this study was that the majority of the budgetary deci­
sions were based on prior budgetary expenditures after they were justi­
fied on the basis of fund availability. He also concluded that the 
budgetary processes in these cities are basically political in nature 
^Thomas J. Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities (Urbana: 
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 
1964). 
49 Crecine, Government Problem Solving; A Computer Simulation of 
Municipal Budgeting. 
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so the behavior of the budget participants is best described as "games­
manship," and the usual behavior pattern was one of compromise and 
negotiation."^ 
Meltsner and Wildavsky (1970) examined the nature of budgetary 
process of Oakland, California. They found that the most important 
characteristic of budgeting in Oakland is revenue behavior which results 
from financial constraints such as a balanced budget and shortages in 
51 
revenues. 
The characteristics of the budgetary process and the behavior of 
52 
the participants in PCE was summarized by Wildavsky (1975) as: 
(1) The budgetary process in PCE is revenue oriented due to the lack 
of resource positions. The budgetary participants in this environment 
are aware of their future needs; however, most of them compromise con­
siderably in the fact of limited resources. Thus, the whole budget pro­
cess in this environment becomes a revenue oriented and expenditures are 
determined according to revenue availability. 
(2) The budgetary participants in this environment use least amount 
of strategic activities. Due to the lack of resources and certainty in 
predicting future funds, the budgetary relationships among participants 
are highly predictable; thus, any departure from these pre-determined 
relationships is easy to discover. 
(3) Certainty in this environment creates simplicity in budget 
"^David Armand Caputo, "The Normative and Empirical Implications 
of the Budgetary Processes of Four Medium-Size Cities" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970). 
53-A. J. Meltsner and A. Wildavsky, "Leave City Budgeting Alone: 
A Survey, Case Study and Recommendations for Reform," from Financing 
the Metropolis, edited by J. P. Crecine (Stage Publications, Inc. 1970), 
Chapter 12. 
5 2  Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Pro­
cesses , pp. 203-219. 
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calculations; however, poverty limits change in the budget's original 
base. 
Ill. Poor and Uncertain Environments (PUE) 
Caiden and Wildavsky in their book "Planning and Budgeting in 
Ppor Countries" examined the major features of the governmental budget­
ary processes in poor and uncertain countries. They pointed out that 
the major feature of the budgetary processes in these countries is 
repetition. The basic reason for this phenomenon is extreme and 
extensive uncertainty which, when combined with severe scarcity of 
financial resources, narrow the time span of budget decisions and 
enforce the budget participants to renegotiate the budget throughout 
the year. The repetitive budget enforces the budget participants to 
enact in a complete series of strategic maneuvers. Thus, increases 
53 
the complexity of the budget decision making process. 
Patton (1975) conducted an empirical study to examine the bud­
getary process of the Confederate States of America during the Civil 
War. The Confederacy resembled a poor and uncertain environment because 
the sources and quantities of revenues and thus expenditures were 
uncertain. The government had to deal with lack of information, few 
trained personnel and political instability as well as military prob­
lems. Thus, the Confederacy experienced budgetary poverty because of 
the inability to mobilize sufficient resources at the same time, the 
Confederacy experienced budgetary uncertainty because of inability to 
project the flow of either expenditures or revenues in the near future. 
This study concluded that the Confederate budgetary process was repeti-
tive in terms of both requests and appropriations. The repetitive 
53 Caiden and Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries. 
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budgeting encouraged strategic maneuvers to be used extensively by the 
budget participants and increased the complexity of the decision making 
process. Patton's major findings concurred with Caiden and Wildavsky's 
conclusions. 
Wildavsky (1975) summarized the characteristics of the budgetary 
process as well as the behavior of the participants in this environment 
55 
as: 
(1) The poor and uncertain nations employ a budgetary process 
of repetition. Lack of sufficient resources leads the partici­
pants in this environment to delay expenditures in order to ensure 
that their financial resources are not depleted. In the mean­
time, uncertainty causes them to reprogram or repeat funds in 
order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. Thus, the bud­
get in this environment becomes meaningless and mainly repeti­
tive of the previous years. 
(2) The budgetary strategies are most used in this environment. 
The existing poverty and uncertainty increase the strategic 
activities among the participants. Since the administrative 
agencies are not sure of their needs and the control organ does 
not have the financial capability to grant these requests, the 
administrative agencies tend to exaggerate their request, know­
ing in advance that these requests will be substantially altered 
by the control organ. 
54 Carl Vernon Patton, "Budgeting Under Crisis: The Confederacy 
as a Poor Country," Administrative Science Quarterly (September 1975), 
pp. 355-69. 
"^Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Process, pp. 203-219. 
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(3) PUE has the most complicated budgetary process among all 
other environments. Poverty and uncertainty make it difficult 
for the budget participants to predict next year's budget. Any 
one financial year is likely to be quite different from last or 
next year's budget in terms of revenue and expenditures. Hence, 
the budgetary process in this environment becomes very complex 
in calculating the budget, and in many times most of the deci­
sions are arbitrary. 
IV. Mixed Environment 
Wealth and certainty are mixed in different proportions in Ameri­
can States. Some have the characteristics of rich and certain environ­
ment and others are most like the poor and certain environment. At the 
state level, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to study 
the governmental budgetary processes. Anton (1967) investigated the 
budgetary process in Illinois for the period 1961-1963 by utilizing an 
open-end interview format. His conclusion supported the incrementalism 
56 
approach to the budgetary process. 
Sharkansky analyzed the requests of 592 state agencies in 19 
states. He concluded that the budgetary process at the state level is 
57 
a combination of incrementalism and legislative dependence. 
Elmore (1978) in his study of South Carolina's budgetary process 
confirmed the notion of incrementalism in the budgetary process. One 
important attribute of Elmore's study is that he employed the aggregate 
data approach which was introduced by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky. 
56 
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi­
tures," pp. 27-43. 
"^Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget 
Success in State Legislatures," pp. 1220-31. 
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In addition, he utilized the descriptive analysis by Anton. In other 
words, he utilized the following tools to investigate the budgetary 
process. 
(1) Modification of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's models 
to test the notion of incrementalism in the South Carolina 
budgetary process. 
(2) Modification of Anton's open-end interview to describe 
the role perceptions of major budgetary participants. 
The major finding of Elmore's study is that incrementalism as a 
descriptive tool and as a bargaining process in South Carolina's bud­
getary process is retained, but incrementalism as an explanatory tool 
to provide reasons for the marginality of changes in budget outcomes 
is rejected.^ 
In summary, Figure 4 outlines the characteristics of the budget­
ary process, frequency of strategic activities, and the degree of com­
plexity in calculation for the classes of budgetary environments. 
Since the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments, 
to the knowledge of this researcher, has never been investigated, the 
present study is aimed toward examining empirically the characteris­
tics of the budgetary process in this environment. This involves 
analyzing the role of the major participants in the budget of the Saudi 
Arabian government, and examining the major characteristics of the 
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. Finally, the character­
istics of the budgetary processes and the role of the major budgetary 
participants in rich and uncertain environments will be compared with 
those of the other environments. 
58 
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Figure 4. The Characteristics of the Budgetary Processes, Frequency of the Strategic Maneuvers, and 
the Degree of Complexity in the Calculation for the Classes of Budgetary Environments. 
Economic Wealth and 
Financial Predictability 
Characteristics of 
the Budgetary Process 
Frequency of the 
Strategic Maneuver 
Degree of Complexity 
in the Calculations 
(1) Rich and Certain 
Environments 
Incremental Budgeting Moderate Simple 
(2) Poor and Certain 
Environments 
Revenue Budgeting Lowest Moderate 
(3) Poor and Uncertain 
Environments 
Repetitive Budgeting Highest Complex 
(4) Rich and Uncertain 
Environments 
1  ? ? 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966, 1966, 1971, 1974) have 
formalized research methods that investigate the budgetary process in 
rich and certain environments. Recent research in the other budgetary 
environments can be seen as refinements, extensions, or challenges to 
the basic orientation presented in these works. Since no study has 
been conducted to investigate the budgetary process in rich and uncer­
tain environments, reliable precedent with respect to methodology in 
this environment is unavailable. Therefore, a combination of research 
methods is used in this study. This combination includes library re­
search, interviews, empirical testing of the quantitative budgetary 
data from the records of the Saudi Arabian government, and statistical 
analysis. 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed 
in the investigation of the budgetary process in rich and uncertain 
budgetary environment of Saudi Arabia. The first section describes the 
interview phase of the study designed to investigate the nature of the 
budgetary process and the budget participants role perceptions. 
Section II describes the quantitative analysis of budget data. 
I. Interview 
Open-end interviews were conducted with major participants in 
the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. The interview format 
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is similar to that used by Caputo (1970) in his study of four medium-
size cities.^ The major objectives of this research tool are to pro­
vide a description of the budgetary process and the role perceptions 
of the major budgetary participants. Following is an outline of the 
interview objectives, a description of instrumentation, and a specifi­
cation of the subjects. 
The Objectives of the Open-End Interview 
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky series of the studies (1966, 
1966, 1971, 1974) relied heavily on testing budget data for the period 
1947-1963 in studying the characteristics of the budgetary process of 
the United States. Anton (1967) utilized the open-end interview format 
in investigating the budgetary process in Illinois for the period 1961-
1973. Elmore (1970) combined both research tools (analysis of budget 
data and interviews) in analyzing the South Carolina budgetary process 
for the period 1967-1977. The objectives of utilizing the open-end 
interview in this study are: (A) to describe the actual budgetary pro­
cess and (B) to determine the role perceptions of major budgetary 
participants. 
(A) Description of the Actual Budgetary Process 
Wildavsky suggested the development of a descriptive bud­
getary theory as a substitute to the normative theory that was 
suggested by Kay. Such a theory involves descriptive and 
empirical research as to how the budget is actually created. 
In this context, he argued 
"'"Caputo, "The Normative and Empirical Implications of the Budget­
ary Processes of Four Medium-Size Cities.11 
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"...the point is that until we develop more 
adequate descriptive theory about budgeting, 
until we know something about existing situations 
in which the participants find themselves under our 
political system, proposals for major reforms must 
be based on awfully inadequate understanding.1^  
One major objective of using the open-end interview format in 
this study is to provide knowledge (or a description) of the budgetary 
process of the Saudi Arabian government. This knowledge is obtained 
by questioning the major budgetary participants about the actual 
budgetary process. Personal observations of the major steps of the 
budgetary process were used to verify these responses. 
(B) Role Perceptions of the Major Budgetary Participants 
The second major objective of the interview is to describe 
and analyze the role perception of the budgetary participants 
in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
Apart from economic or political differences, any governmental 
budgetary process includes two groups of participants - the "requestor" 
group and the "giver" group. The first group commonly is comprised ot 
the government administrative agencies while the second group includes 
the central control organs. Every agency budget office is viewed as 
the location for developing and orchestrating the budget process. 
The pervasive notion in government budget literature is that the 
role of the agency budget official or requestor group varies along a 
continuum ranging from expansion of resources to maintenance of avail-
3 
able resources. In rich and certain environments, Wildavslcy maintains 
the position that agency people are expected to advocate increasing 
^Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budgeti; leforms," p. 189. 
3 
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi­
tures," p. 27. 
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4 
appropriations. Anton reached the same conclusion at the state level. 
He observed: 
"...I do have a good deal of confidence in the 
assertion that very few responsible agency admin­
istrators will be likely to request less money than 
is currently available to them. 
Anton attributed this phenomenon to the environmental pressure to 
expand the agency budget. He continued: 
"...To request a smaller budget than the current 
budget is to suggest that the job being done by 
the agency is not sufficiently important to warrant 
a grant or claim on state resources and that the 
administrator in charge of that job is not suffi­
ciently aggressive (or competent) to make the claim 
....requesting an increase is the surest method 
available to the administrator to satisfy each of 
its audiences. 
Lafavor, in his study of the New Mexico budgetary process, docu­
mented that the operating agency heads consistently request more funds. 
Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina agencies, concluded that the 
g 
agency heads were concerned only with increasing expenditure levels. 
The maintenance of currently available resources (maintaining 
agency requests within the boundaries of the actual needs) is the other 
extreme of the budget official's role. This role was documented by 
Rufus Browning in his study of two Wisconsin departments. In an inter­
view with the budget official, the official response was: 
4 
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budget Process, p. 18. 
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi­
tures," p. 27. 
^Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
^John Lafavor, "Zero-Base Budgeting in New Mexico," State Govern­
ment (Spring 1974), p. 109. 
g 
Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process: Man in the Muddle, 
p. 74. 
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"...The budget is supposed to reflect only the 
judgement of the administrator. There is no 
point in playing it cozy in trying to second-
guess everybody along the line. The budget 
should reflect only felt needs, nothing more, 
or less. 
Thus, the evidence from empirical research suggests that the agency 
budget official is mainly concerned with .increasing budget appropria­
tions . 
The budgetary process literature emphasizes decision-making 
criteria and agency budgetary strategy. In other words, the criteria 
the budget officials use to decide how much to request and the strate­
gies to be used to maintain or increase the amount of money available 
to the governmental agencies are investigated. Wildavsky pointed out 
that the simplest approach would be to add up the cost of all worth­
while projects and to submit the total.Due to the limitations in 
resources, the governmental agencies use strategic processes to compete 
for these scarce resources. 
In a RCE, budgetary decisions are often characterized as incre­
mental. So, the administrative agencies in this environment request 
certain funds with these relationships in mind. Thus, the decisions 
are considered simple compared with other budgetary environments. At 
the same time, the administrative agencies do not rely heavily on 
strategic maneuvers because the relationships between the agency and 
the control organ are highly determined. 
In PCE, the budgetary process is characterized as revenue 
9 Quoted from Anton, "Role and Symbols in Determination of State 
Expenditures," p. 28. 
"^Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budget Process, p. 31. 
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constraint. Certainty in this environment creates simplicity in calcu­
lations, but poverty limits change in the budget's original base. 
Because of the lack of resources and certainty in predicting future 
funds, the budgetary relationships among participants are highly pre­
dictable, and the administrative agencies in this environment use stra­
tegic maneuvers less than any other environments. 
The budgetary process in a PUE is characterized as repetitive 
budgeting. The administrative agencies in this environment face very 
complicated problems in deciding the amount of funds to be requested. 
Poverty and uncertainty make it difficult for the budget participants 
to predict next year's budget. Any fiscal year is quite different from 
the next or previous year in terms of revenues, expenditures, foreign 
aids, and inflation. Hence, budgetary process in this environment is 
very complex in calculating the requests of the administrative agency. 
The administrative agencies in this environment rely heavily on stra­
tegic maneuvers in order to survive, so they tend to exaggerate their 
requests knowing in advance that these requests will be substantially 
altered by the control organ. 
The second group in any governmental budgetary process can be 
characterized as the giver group. The power and the organization 
structure of the giver group varies according to the country's political 
environment. In some countries, the power of making most of the budget­
ary decisions rests in the central-control organ. In others, this power 
is divided among different political organizations. 
"'""'vildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Processes, pp. 5-231. 
•Sv 
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An example of the first category exists in most poor and uncer­
tain countries. The Ministry of Finance or equivalent in those count­
ries is the most powerful governmental institution in budgetary 
decisions. 
An example of the second category is the governmental budgetary 
process of the United States. The central-control organ in the United 
States is relatively weak compared with poor and uncertain countries. 
In fact, there is no Finance Ministry in the United States. The direc­
tor of the office of management and budget does not have the final 
decision in budgetary matters. Actually, Congress can override the 
judgement of the office of management and budget (OMB). The role of 
the giver group in the United States changes as the budget moves 
through the budget cycle. After the OMB has reviewed the budget 
requests and final decisions are made, the OMB becomes an advocate 
12 before the legislative appropriation committee. 
The pervasive notion in governmental budgetary literature is 
that the giver group acts as a guardian of the public treasures. 
Wildavsky described the most generally accepted role of the appropriation 
13 
committee as guardian of the public purse. Schick, in his study of 
the control pattern in state budget execution, concluded that the 
"watchdog" function was the most accurate description of the budget 
14 
review officer's role. Anton, in his study of state expenditures, 
attributed the "watchdog" role to the mistrust in the agency budget 
12Ibid., pp. 105-207. 
13 Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 147. 
14 
Allen Schick, "Control Patterns in State Budget Execution," 
Public Administration Review (1964), pp. 47-106. 
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process and to political and personal reasons. He observed: 
"...recognizing the strength of built-in pressures 
to expand budget, then, and believing that these 
pressures will be reflected in budget requests, 
reviewing officials naturally see themselves as 
"cutter". . .To explain ciie apparent negativism of 
budget review officials solely in terms of their 
mistrust of agency budget estimates, however, 
would be to overlook the personal and political 
stake they have in doing what they do....Their 
failure to make the cuts others expected them to 
make would challenge the grounds for the existence 
of specialized review agencies and thus threaten 
the jobs they hold."15 
Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina budgetary process, 
described the role of the state budget and control board as "gatekeeper" 
to the state treasury.^ In poor and uncertain environments, Wildavsky 
pointed out that repetitive budgeting results in careless estimating by 
departments, which leads to indiscriminate budget cutting by the 
finance ministry.^ 
The purpose of the role perception portion of the interview 
phase is to determine the perceived role of the participants in rich 
and uncertain environment, specifically, the Saudi Arabian budgetary 
process. The role perceptions determined from the interviews are used 
in conjunction with the analysis of actual budgetary data described in 
the second methodological stage to investigate conformity of role per­
ception and actual decision behavior. 
15 Anton, "Roles and Symbols in Determination of State Expendi­
tures," p. 30. 
"^Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process: Managing the 
Muddle, p. 80. 
17 Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Process, 
p. 147. 
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Instrumentation 
Open-end interviews were conducted with the major participants 
in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process during the period 
May 14, 1980 - August 18, 1980. The interview format is similar to 
that used by Caputo (1970) with some modification (see Appendix I). 
Since English is not the first language of the participants, the inter­
views were conducted in Arabic (see Appendix II). The responses were 
hand written, documented, and then translated back into English. 
Finally, the results were transcribed. The interviews ranged in length 
from thirty minutes to two hours. The average interview was approxi­
mately one hour. 
As previously stated, the interviews were designed to provide a 
description of the budgetary process and to describe the role percep­
tion of the major budgetary participants. To achieve these objectives, 
the interview used in this study stressed the following main points: 
(1) The formal and informal budgetary procedures. 
(2) The role of the participants during each stage of the. 
process. 
(3) The decision criteria used by the participants during each 
stage of the process, the reason for using these criteria, and 
their effectiveness. 
(4) The formal and informal contacts with the other budgetary 
participants during each stage of the process and their results. 
Subjects 
The subjects of the interview consisted of a non-random sample 
of the participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
A total of 47 interviews were completed. It was felt that a larger 
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sample was both Impratical and unnecessary due to the observed redun­
dancy in the later interviews. 
Data Analysis 
To describe the Saudi Arabian budgetary process, the responses 
of all subjects were examined to determine whether a discernable pat­
tern existed among them. The results were also confirmed by reviewing 
official government publications and personal observations of the 
actual process. 
The data gathered were also used to analyze the role perception 
of the budgetary participants. Accordingly, the subjects were divided 
into groups (see Figure 5). 
(1) The directors of the budget or fiscal department of each 
agency (DBA). 
(2) The staff of the budget or fiscal department for each 
agency (SBA). 
(3) The senior staff officers of the budget department of the 
Ministry of Finance (OBF). 
(4) The staff of the budget department of the Ministry of 
Finance (SBF). 
The role, the decision criteria, the reason for using the cri­
teria and effectiveness, the formal and informal contacts with other 
participants and its results are analyzed for each group. 
Secondly, the subjects were then divided into two groups, 
namely: 
(1) The Requestor Group which consisted of the DBA and SBA 
for each agency. 
(2) The Giver Group which consisted of the OBF and SBF. 
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Figure 5. Summary of the Interviewing Process. 
TOTAL COMPLETED 
SUBJECTS INTERVIEWS REMARKS 
I. Requestor Group 
1. The directors of 15 
budget or fiscal 
departments for 
each agency. 
(DBA) 
2. The staff of the 15 
budget or fiscal 
department for 
each agency. 
(SBA) 
Non-random sample consisted 
of 15 directors of the 
budget or fiscal department 
of 15 non-defense agencies. 
Non-random sample consisted 
of one of the staff of the 
budget or fiscal department 
of 15 non-defense agencies. 
II. Giver Group 
1. The senior staff 
officers of the 
budget department 
of the Ministry 
of Finance. 
(OBF) 
Non-random sample of the 
staff who make the primary 
decisions in reviewing the 
agencies' budget. 
The staff of the 
budget department 
of the Ministry of 
Finance. 
(SBF) 
10 Non-random sample of the 
staff members who are 
directly involved in the 
budget process. 
TOTAL 47 
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II. Empirical Testing of the Quantitative 
Budget Data 
The second stage of che study is designed to determine whether 
the quantitative budget data are consistent with the budget descrip­
tion and role perceptions suggested by the interviews. 
The first two hypotheses to be tested during this stage related 
to the nature of the budgetary process in the rich and uncertain envi^ 
ronment of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the degree of incrementalism 
in the process and the extent to which supplemental budgeting is used. 
The third hypothesis investigates which factor (independent variables) 
influence the budgetary output (the dependent variable) in this environ­
ment and the relative strength of those influences. 
The Degree of Incrementalism in the Budgetary Process 
As discussed previously, research in the other three budgetary 
environments has shown that in only the rich and certain environments 
is the incremental process present. Based upon this previous research, 
it does not appear whether wealth or a combination of wealth and cer­
tainty that lends itself to incrementalism. However, it is argued here 
that the presence of uncertainty in an environment will not allow for 
an incremental process. The combination of unreliable forecasts, non-
diversified revenue, lack of information, and lack of qualified per­
sonnel characterizing an uncertain environment is inconsistent with 
incremental budgetary process. To investigate the degree of incre­
mentalism in the budgetary process the magnitude of year-to-year 
budgetary change will be analyzed. 
Previous research concerning the governmental budgetary process 
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in different environments has investigated the magnitude of budgetary 
changes from one year to the next as a means of testing the degree of 
incrementalism in a given budgetary process. Wildavsky (1964) analyzed 
the range of variation as the percentage of increase or decrease of 
appropriation as compared to previous years (or the magnitude of bud­
getary changes) for a sample of the U. S. federal agencies over twelve 
years. He found that a third of these cases (149 out of 444) show 
modification of 5 percent or less. Slightly more than half of the 
cases (233) show less than 10 percent modification. Approximately 75 
percent of the cases (326) show modication within 30 percent. The 
study used criteria of 0 to 30 percent change to define an incremental 
process. Accordingly, it was concluded that the budgetary process in 
18 
the United States at the federal level is incremental. 
Fenno (1966) analyzed the changes in 576 congressional appropri­
ations granted to federal agencies from one year to the next. By using 
0 to 20 percent as a cut-off point, it was found that almost three 
quarters of the agencies had grown on an incremental scale. Thus, he 
concluded that the budgetary process in the United States is incre-
19 
mental. Bailey and O'Connor defined adjustments in the range of 
0-10 percent as incremental; modification in the range of 11 - 30 
percent as intermediate; and variations over 30 percent as non-
incremental . ^ 
18 Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 14. 
19 
Fenno, The Power of the Purse. 
20 John J. Bailey and Robert J. O'Connor, "Operationalizing Incre­
mentalism: Measuring the Muddles," Public Administration Review, 
January/February 1975, pp. 60-63. 
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This study uses similar techniques to investigate the degree of 
incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
Magnitude of change in budgetary allocations is defined as the ratio 
of allocation in a given fiscal year to the allocations in the last 
fiscal year. Thus, 
ALL 
k ALL t 
g~t 
^8, t-1 
where: 
& All = The Magnitude of Change in budgetary allo-
8 > *-
cations for agency g in fiscal year t. 
ALL = The original budgetary allocations for 
8 s'-
agency g in fiscal year t 
ALL , = The original budgetary allocations for 
8 > t-± 
agency g in fiscal year t-1. 
Since there is no clear definition of "incrementalism" in bud­
getary literature, and the issue remains subjective, this study recog­
nizes the conservative criteria used by Bailey and O'Connor to test 
the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian governmental budget­
ary process. Three categories are identified: 
(I) "Incremental" where ALL . = 1.00-1.10 
8>t 
(II) "Relatively Incremental" where ALL = 1.11-1.30 
8 > 
(III) "Non-Incremental where l.OO^&ALL \ 1.30 
8 > •-/ 
The first hypothesis tested is as follows: 
HI. The budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defense 
agencies is non-incremental in nature. The magnitude of 
changes in budgetary allocation (£ALL )^1.30 or ^1.00). 
8 > t ^ 
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The magnitude of change in budgetary allocations for 28 agencies 
is analyzed. The number of cases ir. each category is calculated and 
tabulated for each fiscal year. Also, the ratio of the cases in each 
category to the total cases in each fiscal year is calculated and 
tabulated. 
Since the magnitude of change in budgetary allocations might 
vary according to type of expenditure, the data are further analyzed 
by type of expenditure. Hence, the magnitude of change in budgetary 
allocations for each type of expenditure is defined as: 
ALL. 
A ALL. = 
i,g,t 
where: 
ALL. = The magnitude of change in budgetary allo-
1 > 8 > «-
cations for expenditure i, agency g in 
fiscal year t. 
k ALL. = The original budgetary allocation for expen-
1 > §»*-
diture i, agency g in fiscal year t. 
ALL. , = The original budgetary allocations for 
•*-»6 > 
expenditure i, agency g in fiscal year t-1. 
i = The types of expenditures: salaries, general 
expenditures, other expenditures, and 
projects. 
The number of cases in each catetory of incrementalism calcu­
lated for each type of expenditure for each period of the study. Also, 
the ratio of the cases in each category to the total cases in the 
entire period is calculated and reported for each type of expenditure. 
The magnitude of changes in actual expenditures are used also 
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to test the degree of incrementalism in budgeting process. The magni­
tude of change in actual expenditures is defined as: 
AE 
& AE JLII 
s,t 
"g.t-i 
where: 
£ AEg t = The magnitude of change in actual expendi­
tures for agency g in fiscal year t. 
AE = The actual expenditures for agency g in 
8 > t 
fiscal year t. 
AE , = The actual expenditures for agency g in 
8) t—1 
fiscal year t-1. 
The number of cases in each category is calculated and tabulated 
for each fiscal year. Also, the ratio of the cases in each category to 
the total cases in each fiscal year is calculated. 
The Existence of Supplemental Budgeting 
Wildavsky conjectured that if a rich and uncertain budgetary 
environment exists the participants will engage in supplemental budget­
ing. In this context, he argued: 
"....My hypothesis about budgeting in environments that 
are rich but administratively uncertain is that, when 
such environments are discovered, they will be found 
to engage in supplemental budgeting - treating each 
expenditure request and grant as if it were a supple­
mental due to unexpected circumstances. The spending 
agency would wait until its funds ran out, because 
it could not estimate what it would need or actually 
be able to spend, and the finance ministry would 
reconsider its allowments, because it was not at all 
certain of how much revenue it could raise or had on 
hand."22 
22 
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Processes, p. 11. 
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Thus, uncertainty in budgetary environment creates an inability 
on the part of budgetary participants to anticipate short-run needs 
and wealth allows such practice. Accordingly, the need for supple­
mental budgeting is hypothesized. The second hypothesis tested is: 
H2. Supplemental budgeting is a characteristic of the 
budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defense agencies 
as evidenced by the existence of supplementary budgets 
in the majority (50%) of the agencies for the majority 
(50%) of the fiscal years studied. 
To test the hypothesis data is calculated as to the number and 
percentage of agencies that engaged in supplemental budgeting during 
each fiscal year during the study period. 
The Relations Among Participants 
To gain a keener insight into the nature of the budgetary pro­
cess and the interaction among budgetary participants, another series 
of tests is employed to investigate the factors which influence the 
budgetary output (budget expansion). A group of variables suggested 
to be influential in the budgetary process by previous research are 
empirically tested for potential relationships with the dependent 
23 
variable. The third hypothesis tested is: 
H3. A significant association exists between budget expan­
sion in the Saudi Arabian budgetary process and agency 
acquisitiveness, Ministry of Finance support, estimated 
23 See for example, Sharkansky, "Agency Requests Gubernatorial 
Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures;" Wannat, "Personnel 
Measures of Budgetary Interaction;" and Elmore, The South Carolina 
Budgetary Process: Managing the Muddle. 
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revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and spending 
efficiency during that last period. 
Numerous techniques have been utilized in the literature to 
investigate relationships among various budget participants in other 
environments. For example, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, in a series 
of studies (1966, 1966, 1971, 1974), explained the federal budget 
behavior of the United States through linear models. Specifically, a 
series of mathematical models was constructed to represent several 
decision rules for both the Requestors Group and for the Givers Group. 
For each series of requests or appropriations, they selected that rule 
which most closely represented actual behavior. Sharakansky, in his 
study of the budgetary process in nineteen states, investigated the 
relationships between the budgetary participants by analyzing the 
annual percentage changes in each stage and by analyzing the coeffi­
cient of simple correlation between the outputs of each budgetary stage. 
Danziger, in his study of the British Municipal Budgeting, utilized 
multiple regression techniques in investigating the relationship among 
the budgetary participants. Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina 
budgetary process, used the annual percentage changes technique and 
simple correlation to study the relationship between the participants. 
Also, he used the regression analysis technique to explain the effects 
24 
of multiple variables on budgetary changes. The present study 
employs a combination of these techniques to describe and explain the 
relationships between the participants in Saudi Arabian governmental 
budgetary process. 
24 For detailed discussion of these studies, please see Chapter II. 
•Ki. 
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The Coefficient of Simple Correlation is employed in the present 
study to investigate the relationship between the dependent variable 
(budget expansion) and the independent variables (agency acquisitive­
ness, Ministry of Finance support, estimated revenue expansion, actual 
revenue expansion and spending efficiency). Specifically, the Coeffi­
cients of Simple Correlation between the dependent variable and inde­
pendent variables were computed for each of the 26 agencies (cross-time 
analysis). The agencies were also grouped by types of services, and 
the Coefficients of Simple Correlation between the dependent and inde­
pendent variables were computed for each of the five types (Aggregate 
Data Analysis). These correlation coefficients were examined to make 
inferences concerning relationships of the dependent and independent 
variables in order to test Hypothesis No. 3. 
Regression analysis is also used in the study to measure the 
ability of the independent variables to explain the variations in the 
dependent variable. This technique was used by Davis, Dempster and 
Wildavsky to explain the federal budgetary behavior of the United 
States by Danziger to explain the relationships among budget partici­
pants in British municipal budgeting, and by Elmore to explain the 
nature of the relationships in the South Carolina Budgetary process. 
Regression analysis extends simple correlation analysis to allow the 
measurement of associations between more than one independent variable 
and to test for the statistical significance of such associations. 
Thus, regression analysis was used to make inferences concerning the 
factor(s) that affect Saudi Arabian budget expansion. Step-wise 
regression was performed for each of the six years (cross-sectional 
analysis). 
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Data and Variables 
Quantitative budgetary data were collected from all non-
defense Saudi Arabian governmental agencies for the fiscal years 
1973/74 through 1978/79. The period was chosen to represent rich 
and uncertain environment. Prior to 1973 per capita income in 
Saudi Arabia was below $900, figures used by Wildavsky as a minimum 
in characterizing rich environment. During the 1974 period, oil 
prices rose significantly and per capita income rose to over 
25 $6,000. Thus, Saudi Arabia can be characterized as a poor and 
uncertain environment prior to the study period and a rich and 
uncertain environment during the study period. 
Each agency must meet the following criteria to be included 
in this study: 
(1) the agency must be non-defense. 
(2) Agency data throughout the period of the study must be 
available. 
(3) The agency must not have any major structural changes 
throughout the period of the study. 
A total of 26 agencies met the above criteria for inclusion in 
this study. Two other agencies were included in testing the magnitude 
of change in budgetary allocations due to their data availability. The 
25 U. S. Department of State, Foreign Economic Trends and Their 
Implication for the United States, International Marketing 
Information Series, No. 74-069, July 1974 and No. 78-054, May 1978. 
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data for each agency for each fiscal year consisted of: 
(1) The original agency's planned requests. 
(2) The original budgetary allocations excluding any supple­
mental requests. 
(3) The original budgetary allocations for salaries, for 
general expenditures, and for other expenditures and projects. 
(4) The total budgetary appropriations approved by the Council, 
of Ministers. 
(5) The total supplemental appropriations. 
(6) The total actual expenditures. 
The data for each fiscal year consisted of total government 
estimated and actual revenues. The data were collected from Saudi 
Arabian records. These records were the government original budget 
documents (Budgets of 1973/74 through 1978/79; the annual reports of 
the Audit Bureau (1973/74 through 1978/79); Statistical Year Book 1978; 
and the five-years development plans 1970 and 1975. The variables used 
in this part of the study are operationally defined as follows: 
Independent Variables 
(1) Agency Acquisitiveness (AA) = 
^8,t-l 
where: 
REQ = The original planned request for agency g for i'rl:;cal 
8>t 
year t. 
APP - = The total Council of Ministers appropriations for 
g, t—l 
agency g for fiscal year t-1. 
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(2) Ministry of Finance Support (MFS) = 
ALL „ 
APP „ . g,t-l 
where: 
ALL = The original budgetary allocation for agency g 
S > £ 
for fiscal year t. 
(3) Spending Efficiency (SE) = 
AE -
g»t~1 
APP „ i g,t-l 
where: 
AE . = The total actual expenditures for agency g for 
6» t—l 
fiscal year t-1. 
(4) Estimated Revenue Expansion (ERE) = 
ER„ 
ARt-l 
where: 
ERfc = The total government estimated revenue for fiscal 
year t. 
ARt - The total government actual revenue for fiscal 
year t-1. 
(5) Actual Revenue Expansion (ARE) = 
AR. 
^t-l 
where: 
AR = The total government actual revenue for fiscal year 
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Dependent Variable 
Budget Expansion (BE) = 
APP „ g.t 
APP . .. g,t-l 
where: 
APP . = The total Council of Ministers 
S.t 
budgetary appropriations for agency 
g for fiscal year t-1. 
The next chaper presents the results of the interviews and the 
quantitative analysis described in this chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section 
is devoted to reporting the results of the open-end interviews with 
major participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. 
The analysis of the quantitative budget data is reported in the second 
section. The conclusions suggested by each research tool are stated 
separately and then considered together. 
I. The Open-End Interview Results 
One major objective of using the open-end interview as a 
research tool was to provide a description of the budgetary process of 
the Saudi Arabian government. The second objective was to describe and 
analyze the role perception of the major budgetary participants. The 
results of those interviews are organized according to the interview 
objectives. 
A. The Formal Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process; 
Descriptive Analysis 
To obtain a description of the current formal Saudi Arabian 
governmental budgetary process, the interviwer asked the study sub-
jects to state the formal budgetary procedures. Specifically, the DBAs 
and SBAs of each agency were asked the following questions: 
(1) How does your agency go about drawing its annual budgetary 
request? 
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(2) How many people and work hours are involved with the 
development of your agency's request? 
(3) After you have submitted your agency's request to the 
general budget affairs, what does your office do? 
(4) After the agency's budget is approved, what does your 
office do? 
The OBFs and SBFs were asked: 
(1) How does your office review and approve each agency's 
annual budget? 
(2) How does your office review and approve the whole govern­
mental budget? 
(3) How many people and work hours are involved with the devel­
opment of the governmental budget? 
(4) After approving the governmental budget, what role does 
your office have in the budget execution? 
The responses of each group to the above questions were analyzed 
to determine if any pattern existed among them. These responses were 
verified through personal observation and a review of the official bud­
getary regulations. The results were organized for each cycle of the 
budgetary process in order to simplify the presentation. 
1. The Formulation Cycle 
The five-year development plan (FYDP) is considered by most of 
the OBFs and SBFs interviewed as the first step in the formulation of 
the country's budget. Concerning the annual budget, this document 
outlines the general objectives of each governmental organization, 
specifies the detailed projects and programs to achieve these 
objectives, and forecasts the financial requirements for these projects 
and programs. The FYDP is prepared every five years by the Ministry of 
Planning with the cooperation of all governmental organizations; it is 
submitted to the Council of Ministers and finally to the King for final 
approval. The plan then becomes compulsory for all governmental 
organizations. 
The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 565, dated May 15, 
1975, required all Ministries and independent agencies to comply with 
the contents of the FYDP in preparing their annual budget. This reso­
lution required the budget department of the Ministry of Finance to 
allocate the required funds for the projects and programs in the plan 
through cooperation and coordination with the central planning organ­
ization (which became the Ministry of Planning) and the concerned 
Ministries or independent agencies. Thus, officially, the FYDP fur­
nishes the basic outline for the formulation of the country's annual 
budget. But the results of the interview suggested the difficulty of 
adherence to the plan in preparing annual budgets of agencies. Some 
of the study subjects attributed this difficulty to the rapid changes 
in the governmental economy, while others cited other reasons such as: 
"Mack of sufficient accounting systems or lack of qualified personnel. 
The results of these interviews reveal that the first actual 
step in the formulation of the country's annual budget is at the budget 
department of the Ministry of Finance (BDF). At the beginning of each 
fiscal year the BDF submits a report to the Minister of Finance. This 
report is prepared with the cooperation of both the revenue department 
of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. The major 
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objectives of this report are to summarize the economic conditions of 
the country; to outline the degree of adherence to the FYDP and to 
suggest any necessary changes to this plan; to forecast the next year's 
revenues; and to recommend the ways of spending the revenues. The 
Minister of Finance discusses this report with concerned government 
officials. After approval, this report furnishes the basic guidelines 
in preparing the country's next year's budget. 
Approximately eight months before the beginning of each fiscal 
year, the BDF issues directives outlining all financial policies as 
well as major procedures which the agencies are to follow in preparing 
the estimate of their next year's budgets. Most of the responses of 
the various agencies' DBA and OBA suggested that these directives are 
the most important guidelines that they follow in preparing the esti­
mate of their agency's annual budget. These directives outline speci­
fic instructions in estimating each chapter of the budget. 
The second step of budget formulation starts at the government 
agencies. After receiving the Ministry of Finance directive, the 
budget or fiscal director of each agency issues instructions to all 
agency departments to prepare an estimate of their actual needs for 
the coming fiscal year. Each of the agency departments submits an 
estimate of their departmental needs for the coming fiscal year. The 
general director of each agency then forms a committee to collate all 
departmental needs and to make financial decisions on the programs 
and projects to be included in the agency's request for the next 
fiscal year. The fiscal requirements to execute these projects and 
programs as well as the estimated cost of salaries, general 
•N». 
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expenditures, and other expenditures are projected on the basis of the 
Ministry of Finance directives. These projections then become the 
agency requests which are submitted to the BDF for review. 
As directed by the Ministry of Finance, the agency request must 
be comprised of four chapters. Chapter I is devoted to salaries, 
allowances and compensations. Chapter II included the agency's 
general expenditures such as furniture, utilities, rents and so on. 
Chapter III is called "other expenditures" and is devoted to expendi­
tures for specific purposes. Chapter IV, "projects/1 is divided into 
two categories: Under-contruction Projects and New Projects. - v 
The first three chapters are broken down into heads and sub­
heads. In Chapter IV, each project is a separate heading. The 
agency's requests for Chapters I, II and III must include a justified 
estimate of each head and sub-head. In addition, the agency request 
must include a summary of spending efficiency to date for each head 
and sub-head, last year's budget, and the agency organization chart. 
Chapter IV requests must include detailed descriptions of the status 
of each project under consideration and the estimated cost of their 
completion. In addition, it must include justifications for each new 
project. 
Although the agencies usually comply with these standardized 
procedures in preparing their estimated requests, the results of the 
interviews suggested that most of the government agencies face major 
problems in preparing their requests. The following factors are often 
cited by most of the participants as the reason for this phenomenon: 
(1) The lack of clarified objectives. Even though the FYDP 
specifies the objectives of each governmental organization, 
these objectives are considered broad and difficult to meet. 
(2) The lack of sufficient accounting systems to generate 
feedback information. Hence, most of the government agencies 
prepare their requests without knowledge of their actual expen­
ditures or vital statistical information. 
(3) The lack of qualified personnel. The interview showed 
that most of the DBA and SBA in the government agencies lack 
the special education in preparing the budget. 
(4) The rapid changes in the economic conditions of the country. 
But in general most of these obstacles are recognized by the 
government, and various special committees have been formed to find the 
proper solutions to these obstacles. 
2. Review Cycle 
Each governmental agency must submit its budget requests for 
Chapter I, II, III and part of Chapter IV (new projects) to the budget 
department of the Ministry of Finance no later than six months prior 
to the beginning of each fiscal year. The deadline for submitting the 
second part of Chapter IV (projects under construction) is three 
months before the beginning of each fiscal year. 
When the budget department receives the requests of every 
agency, this department calls a meeting of each agency representative. 
Usually the senior staff officers of the budget department represents 
the Ministry of Finance and the director of the budget or fiscal 
department of each agency represents the agencies in these meetings. 
The agency representative must justify every item in his agency's 
request. 
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When mutual agreement between these representatives is achieved, 
a comprehensive proposed budget is prepared. If there is sharp dis­
agreement among the representatives, the matter is submitted to the 
Deputy of the Ministry of Finance for the final decision. Officially 
there are specific instructions for reviewing each agency request, but 
most of the study subjects stressed a lack of efficiency in conducting 
these reviews. Again, the same obstacles that faced the agency in. pre­
paring its requests also faced the representatives in negotiating the 
agency budget. 
After reviewing the requests of each agency, the DBF organizes 
the results of the reviews and prepares the proposed government budget 
for the next fiscal year. The Deputy Minister of Finance and Budget 
Affairs then calls a meeting with the Deputy Minister of Planning and 
the Deputy Minister of the concerned agency. There are several objec­
tives of this meeting: to further discuss the agency's proposed 
budget; to investigate the degree of compliance of this proposed 
budget with the FYDP; to analyze the impact of each government program 
and to project the country's economy; and to make an extensive effort 
to balance the budget. The product of this meeting is then submitted 
to the Ministry of Finance, who calls extensive meetings with the OBF 
and other concerned officials to discuss the final proposed budget. 
Then this proposed budget is submitted to the Council of Ministers for 
approval. 
3. Approval Cycle 
As mentioned before, the proposed budget has been approved 
indirectly by the ministers of each agency through their representatives 
in the reviewing cycle. The approval cycle is used only to confirm 
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the proposed budget. Also, the budget is proposed in compliance with 
the policy issued by the cabinet and the King during the fiscal year. 
These policies determine in detail what should and should not 
be approved in the review cycle, which is begun upon submission of the 
proposed budget to the Council of Ministers. In a special meeting 
headed by His Majesty the King, the Council of Ministers discusses the 
proposed budget. After approval, the King singes the budget decree, 
and the budget becomes a law that must be followed by all governmental 
agencies. 
4. Execution and Audit Cycle"^ 
Execution and audit is the final cycle of the Saudi Arabian 
budgetary process, commencing with the beginning of the fiscal year 
(the first day of Raj jab, or approximately May 5). The current 
government budget is composed of two schedules, Schedule A and B. 
Schedule A is for revenue and Schedule B is for expenditures. Schedule 
A is classified by a source of revenues which is disclosed in the 
budget in lump sums and in details. Schedule B (expenditures) is 
classified into titles, a separate one assigned for each ministry or 
agency. 
The title is further classified into sections. A section is 
assigned to a major department and each section is composed of four 
chapters, as discussed earlier. The budget also includes the total 
expenditures for each of the sections of the economy, which makes it 
compatible with the FYDP organizations. Additionally, comparative 
figures for the last year's budget are disclosed for each of the budget 
schedules. 
"'"This cycle will be discussed in general, but the details involve 
the financial system, which is outside the scope of this paper. 
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The sources of the government revenues usually include royalties 
from oil; income taxes from oil companies, other companies and indivi­
duals; custom duties; services fees; and other miscellaneous sources. 
Oil revenues comprise approximately 97 percent of the total government 
revenues in the fiscal year 1979/1980. The responsibility of the oil 
revenue estimation, control and collection is placed primarily on the 
Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance coordinates and cooper­
ates with other government agencies, such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Petroleum in this 
effort. The Department of General Revenues in the Ministry of Finance 
keeps accurate records of each revenue item. Other sources of revenue 
(approximately 3 percent) are estimated, controlled, and collated 
directly by the concerned agencies. 
Approximately two weeks after approval of the budget, the BD'P 
notifies each agency of its budget. Once the agency receives the 
budget, the agency proceeds to use its funds according to the financial 
and accounting instructions. The appropriations of each expenditure 
chapter, head, and sub-heads may not be used for purposes other than 
the ones that are specified in the budget decree and the Ministry of 
Finance instructions. The agency is responsible for keeping a detailed 
record to control its spending activities. 
The financial regulations, within certain limits, allow shifts 
in the original appropriations. The details of these regulations are 
outside the scope of this paper. The interview results show that most 
original appropriations of the government agencies are frequently 
changed during the fiscal year. These changes occur by transferring 
funding throughout the agency or by supplemental appropriations. 
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Uncertainty and the lack of a scientific basis for budget formulation 
are cited by most of the study subjects as the major factors for 
these changes. 
The major objective of the Audit Stage is largely to guarantee 
the compliance of government agencies with the provisions of the 
budget, the government policies, and the financial regulations. 
Specifically, it is to ensure that the agency's budget was spent for 
the predetermined purposes. 
The auditing function is performed simultaneously during the 
fiscal year by both the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Bureau. The 
Ministry of Finance is responsible for pre-audit while the Audit 
Bureau is responsible for post-audit. 
The pre-audit function is performed through a representative 
who is assigned to each agency to ensure that the agency complies with 
the accounting and financial regulations prior to any fund payments. 
The pre-audit function is also performed through the budget department 
of the Ministry of Finance to guarantee that the agency is in compli­
ance with the provisions of the budget. 
The post-audit function is vested in the Audit Bureau, which 
was established as an independent agency in 1953. The major objective 
of the post-audit function is to investigate the compliance of all 
government agencies with the provisions of the budget and with the 
financial regulations. The results of these audits are then submitted 
in an annual report to the Council of Ministers. 
Figure No. 6 summarizes the major formal Saudi Arabian govern­
mental budgetary process described above. 
Figure 6. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process 
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Figure 6. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process (Continued) 
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B. Description and Analysis of the Budgetary Participants' Role 
Perceptions 
This study utilized direct open-end interviews with the major 
participants to describe and analyze the role perception of partici­
pants. Roles to be described and analyzed are primarily those of the 
director of budget or fiscal department of each agency (DBA), the staff 
of the budget or fiscal department of each agency (SBA), the senior 
staff officers of the budget department of the Ministry of Finance 
(OBF), and the staff of the budget department of the Ministry of 
Finance (SBF). The interviewer stressed the following points during 
each interview: 
(1) The formal and informal training of the participants. 
(2) The role of each participant in each budget cycle. 
(3) The decision criteria used in each budget cycle. 
(4) The effectiveness of these criteria. 
(5) The formal and informal contacts with other participants. 
(6) The results of these contacts. 
1. The Requestor Group: Role Description and Analysis 
The origin of development and orchestration of the Saudi Arabian 
budgetary process is in the agencies' budget or fiscal offices. In 
some agencies, this responsibility is divided between both departments. 
The budget department formulates requests, while the fiscal department 
executes the budget. In other agencies, the fiscal department performs 
both duties. Thus, the budget or fiscal officials are considered the 
main participants in the agency budgetary process. Following is a 
summary of the results of the open-end interviews conducted with 
fifteen DBAs and fifteen SBAs. 
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Formal and Informal Background Training 
The absence of skilled and highly trained budgetary professionals 
was the rule not the exception in each of the departments. Of the fif­
teen DBAs interviewees, only four had college degrees, and only six had 
professional training in fiscal and budgeting fields. The formal edu­
cation of the DBAs ranged from secondary school to university level. 
The experience of these DBAs ranged from five to fifteen years. But 
most of the DBAs had "on the job" experience. Nine of the directors 
had at least one intensive course in budgeting and accounting. 
The vast majority of the SBAs also lacked professional skills. 
Of fifteen SBAs interviewed, only one had a college degree, and only 
four had had professional training in budget and accounting fields. 
The formal education of the SBAs ranged from secondary school to col­
lege level. Most of the informal training of the SBAs was composed of 
"on the job training." This experience ranged from two to nine years. 
Six of the SBAs had had an intensive course in budgeting and accounting. 
The evidence suggests that the DBAs and OBAs lack the necessary 
and professional skills to perform their duties. This problem has 
discouraged any budgetary innovations and reforms. 
The Role of the DBAs and SBAs in the Budgetary Process 
When asked to describe their role in the budgetary process, most 
of the DBAs viewed their role as "planning and budget coordinators" 
rather than "decision makers." They considered themselves "budget and 
financial matter specialists" in addition "defenders of the agency's 
requests." The following two excerpts typify responses of the DBAs: 
Q. What is your role in the budgetary process? 
A. My role, as the director of the budget department, is 
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composed of the following functions: 
(1) To coordinate and prepare the agency's five-year 
development plan (FYDP). 
(2) To represent the agency in the discussions of this 
plan at the Ministry of Planning. 
(3) To determine the degree of agency compliance with 
the FYDP. 
(4) To furnish the basic statistical and feedback informa 
tion to the department heads. 
(5) To coordinate and prepare the agency's annual 
requests. 
(6) To represent the agency in the budget reviews at the 
Ministry of Finance. 
(7) To provide professional consultation to the agency in 
budget and financial matters. 
Q. Does your role include any part of budget execution? 
A. Not directly. This office was established last year to 
coordinate budget and planning activities. The execution func­
tion is primarily the responsibility of the fiscal department. 
Q. Do you become involved in the budget decision making? 
A. Actually, no. My role is confined to coordination among 
the various departments in preparing their requests. It is not 
my responsibility to make budgetary decisions. I am only a 
specialist who provides the basic information and explains the 
budgetary and financial regulations. After I receive the 
departments' request, I coordinate them and send them to a 
special committee. I represent this department on this 
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committee, which is headed by the general director. This 
committee makes the major budgetary and planning decisions. 
The other DBA also stressed the same role: 
Q. What is your role in the budgetary process? 
A. The department of fiscal affairs is concerned mainly with 
all budgeting and financial matters, such as preparing the 
annual agency requests, representing the agency in the budget 
reviews at the Ministry of Finance, and supervising execution 
of the budget. 
Q. Does your department involve itself in the preparation of 
the FYDP? 
A. Yes. Since we do not have a separate budget department, 
this department helps in the preparation of the agency FYDP. 
We furnish the basic statistical and financial information to 
various departments. At the same time, this office is respon­
sible for determining the degree of compliance of the annual 
budget with the FYDP. 
Q. So, your department is responsible for both budget formu­
lation and execution. 
A. As I have explained before, ,yes. But the agency plans to 
establish a separate budget department. Then both the planning 
and preparation of the budget will be the responsibility of this 
department. This trend is evident in almost every government 
agency. I personally approve of this trend because this depart­
ment cannot perform both functions. Also, the separation of 
budget formulation from budget extension is good internal 
control. 
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Q. Do you make any budgetary decisions? 
A. No. This is the responsibility of the special committee. 
This committee usually is headed by the agency's general 
director. I serve on this committee with the other departmental 
directors. 
When asked to describe their role in the budgetary process, most 
of the SBAs considered it to be "assistant to the DBAs." They were 
mainly concerned with preparation of the necessary information to help 
in the formulation and review of the budget. 
The role of the SBA who worked in the budget department differed 
slightly from the role of SBA in the fiscal department. The first was 
mainly concerned with planning and budgeting matters, the latter with 
both budgeting and accounting matters. Most of the SBAs viewed them­
selves as experts in budget procedures. The following excerpts typi­
fied the SBAs responses: 
Q. What is your role in the budgetary process? 
A. My job, as the supervisor of the accounting department, is 
mainly concerned with budget execution. Since we do not have 
separate budget departments, this office is responsible for 
providing the DBA with the necessary feedback information. 
Q. Then you actually are involved in budget formulation? 
A. Not directly. We provide the information and prepare the 
necessary forms, and the committee makes most of the decisions. 
These excerpts summarize the role of the requestor group in the 
budgetary process. Obviously, the budget or fiscal department is con­
sidered by most of the DBAs and SBAs as the place for formulation and 
execution of the agency's budget. The budget or fiscal department is 
•K,. 
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concerned only with coordination among the agency departments in 
formulating both the agency's plans and requests. Although this 
department does not involve itself in the decision-making process, 
most of the DBAs are members of the agency committee that makes most 
of these decisions. Moreover, the DBAs represent the agency in the 
budget review, so they also consider their role to be that of defender 
of the agency requests. In addition, the fiscal department is respon­
sible for the budget execution. 
In summary, the budget or fiscal department is perceived mainly 
a service department rather than a decision-making department. The 
responsibility for the budgetary decision-making is relegated to 
special committees. 
Decision Criteria and Its Effectiveness 
The FYDP outlines the general objectives for each government 
agency and specifies the projects and the programs to be performed by 
each governmental agency for the next five fiscal years. The plan 
furnishes the basic grounds for most of the budgetary decisions. In 
addition, the Ministry of Finance issues an annual directive outlining 
in detail the procedures to be followed by each agency in preparing 
its annual requests. In spite of the extensive effort by both the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance to standardize the 
criteria in most of the budgetary decisions, the calculations of the 
agency's requests is the most complex step in the budgetary process. 
This complexity leads most of the government agencies to exaggerate 
their annual requests. The vast majority of the DBAs and SBAs 
attributed this complexity to the following causes: 
(1) The lack of clarified objectives. Even though these 
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objectives are spelled out in the FYDP, most of the DBAs and 
SBAs considered them broad and difficult to meat. 
(2) The lack of sufficient accounting systems to generate the 
basic feedback information. Some of the DBAs prepared their 
agency requests without complete knowledge of the actual expen­
ditures during the year. 
(3) The lack of qualified personnel. This obstacle was con­
sidered by most of the DBAs and SBAs as the major cause of the 
complexity in calculation. 
(4) The rapid changes in the economic environment in the 
country. 
The interview revealed that the decision criteria used by the 
agencies differed according to the types of expenditures. Salaries 
and general expenditures (Chapter I and II of the budget) are usually 
estimated through the use of historical precedent. The other expendi­
tures (Chapter III) are estimated according to the agencies' actual 
needs. The estimation of the project's cost (Chapter IV) was consid­
ered by the majority of the DBAs and SBAs as the most difficult task 
in the budget formulation. This difficulty led most governmental 
agencies to exaggerate the cost of these projects. The following 
examples typify the responses of most of the DBAs and SBAs: 
Q. What criteria do you use in evaluating each department 
request? 
A. As I mentioned before, this department does not involve 
itself in the decision part of the budget. But I am a member 
of the committee that makes these decisions. According to the 
Council of Ministers resolution #565, each agency must comply 
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with the guidelines of the FYDP in preparing its annual budget. 
But it is a major problem to adhere to these guidelines because 
we do not have the qualified personnel to give us the necessary 
feedback information. Neither can we adjust to the rapid changes 
in the economic conditions. These problems have led us in pre­
vious years to overestimate or underestimate our requests sub­
stantially. In some years, we have excess funds in our budget. 
In other years, we have asked for more supplemental funds. In 
the committee meetings, we tried to follow the Ministry of 
Finance regulations in preparation of the agency requests. 
Salaries and general expenditures are generally estimated for 
the next year on the basis of last year's appropriations and 
actual needs. Since Chapter III is devoted to other expendi­
tures , these expenditures are estimated on the basis of actual 
needs. We include in our request most of the projects that are 
outlined in the FYDP in addition to modifications of these pro­
jects. But the cost estimation of these projects is the most 
difficult step. This difficulty is mainly due to the lack of a 
sufficient accounting system and ill-qualified personnel as 
well as the rapid changes in the country's economic conditions. 
Thus, we end up over- or underestimating our requests for 
projects. 
When asked about the effectiveness of the decision criteria, 
the majority (approximately 70%) of the DBAs' and SBAs' responses were 
negative. They called for an increase in the quality and quantity of 
the budget department personnel, substantial improvements in the 
accounting systems, and specific and clear objectives and guidelines. 
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When asked if their agencies requested supplementary funds 
during the fiscal year, most replied affirmatively (approximately 76%). 
They attributed this phenomenon to the imprecision in estimating the 
costs of their projects. The following example typifies the response 
of most of the DBAs and SBAs: 
Q. During the execution stage, does your agency request 
supplementary funds? And why? 
A. Yes. But the percentage of these supplemental funds has 
decreased during the last few years. As I mentioned before, we 
may underestimate the cost of some projects and later we have to 
ask for more funds. Or we may underestimate the project costs 
and then we cannot spend the budget funds for these projects. 
The inflation rate and the capacity to spend these funds are 
the major causes of these phenomena. 
In summary, the majority of the budgetary decisions were not 
based on well-defined criteria. This leads to the complexity in the 
budgetary decision process. Even though the regulations called for 
the utilization of the FYDP, the last year's appropriations, the 
spending efficiency, and the agency's actual need, the guidelines were 
not fully followed. The complexity of the budgetary decision-making 
results in the overestiznatiasis or underestimations of most of the 
agencies' requests. Furthermore, the lack of qualified personnel and 
of modern data-gathering procedures discouraged any attempts at new 
innovations in the budgeting process (such as PPBs or ZBB). 
Formal and Informal Contacts with Other Participants and the Results 
of These Contacts 
As discussed above, the DBAs considered their role as to be 
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that of "defenders of the agency's request." This role compels the 
DBAs to make formal and informal contacts with other officials in order 
to justify their agency requests. Also, the lack of well defined 
budgetary decision criteria leads most of the government agencies to 
utilize these contacts as strategical maneuvers to justify their 
requests. The vast majority (approximately 93%) of the DBAs described 
their formal and informal contacts in the affirmative. A typical 
response follows: 
Q. Are you formally or informally in contact with other 
budget participants concerning your requests? 
A. Definitely, yes. In the formulation stage I contact all 
agency departments to explain the general guidelines for pre­
paring their needs. Also, I coordinate efforts among these 
departments to prepare the agency requests. In the reviewing 
stage, I represent the agency in the Ministry of Finance. At 
these meetings, I have to justify the agency's requests. But 
most of the time I do not have the necessary feedback informa­
tion to justify the agency's request. Thus, I use negotiation 
techniques, such as compromising to reach the final figure. 
Actually, the informal contacts with the reviewers are the most 
effective means to inform them about our needs. 
The interviews revealed that the DBAs must resort to "games" and 
strategic maneuvers to secure the Ministry of Finance approval of their 
agency requests. The most common strategic maneuver is to overestimate 
their requests. One of the DBAs said: 
"....Based on my previous experiences, we have to ask for 
100 to get 50." 
-S», 
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Another "game" used by the DBAs is to make personal friendships with 
the budget reviewers. 
In summary, strategic maneuvers are used extensively by the 
DBAs to justify their requests. This phenomenon is attributed to the 
lack of specific deicsion criteria and well-defined objectives. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty of future needs compelled most of the 
agencies to overestimate their requests. 
2. The Giver Group: Role Description and Analysis 
In the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process, the 
Ministry of Finance has the prime responsibility for organizing and 
collecting agency requests and preparing the country's final proposed 
budget. This responsibility is centralized in the budget department 
of the Ministry of Finance. The official of this department represents 
the main participant in reviewing agency requests. Following is a 
summary of the results of the open-end interviews conducted with seven 
senior officers of the budget department (OBF) and with ten staff 
members of that department (SBF). 
Formal and Informal Background Training 
Unlike the agency budget officials, most of the OBFs have both 
extensive formal and informal training backgrouns in government budget­
ing. However, the number of these professionals is not adequate to 
review all the government agency requests in the allowed time span. Of 
the seven OBFs interviewed, four had master degrees in public adminis­
tration, and two had some college education. Most of the OBFs had 
professional training in financial, accounting, end budgeting fields. 
Their "on the job" experience ranged from eight to twenty-two years. 
Although the SBFs did not have the same formal and informal 
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training backgrounds as the OBFs, their training is considered ade­
quate. But again the lack of SBF staff members is insufficient to 
carry out their responsibilities. Of the ten SNFs interviewed, four 
had some college education. Most of the SBFs had at least one course 
in accounting and in budgeting fields. Their "on the job" experience 
ranged from two to ten years. 
It is clear that the budget department of the Ministry of 
Finance, unlike the budget department of the agencies, does not lack 
the professional personnel. However, it does have an inadequate number 
of personnel to perform its functions. 
The Role of OBFs and SBFs in the Budgetary Process 
The major role of the OBFs in the Saudi Arabian governmental 
budgetary process can be more accurately viewed as that of "cutter" 
than "efficient economizers." This role is similar to the role of the 
budget review officers that Schick described in his study of the con­
trol patterns in state budget execution. The budget review officers 
interviewed by Schick indicated that the watch-dog function was an 
accurate description of actual budget review. He attributed this 
phenomenon to the built-in pressure for budget expansion and the feel­
ing that consequently there must be a specialized agency with the task 
2 
of saying "No." The role of the OBFs in the Saudi Arabian govern­
mental budgetary process is also similar to the role of the members of 
state budget and control that are described by Elmore in his study of 
the South Carolina budgetary process. Elmore viewed their role as 
3 
"Gatekeeper of the State Treasury." 
2 ^Schick, "Control Patterns in State Budget Execution," p. 98. 
Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process: Managing the 
Model, p. 80. 
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The responsibility of reviewing the agency's requests in the 
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process is divided among the OBFs. 
Each OBF is primarily responsible for reviewing the agency requests in 
one sector of the economy such as the economic resource sector, the 
human resources development sector, and so on....After receiving the 
agency requests, the OBF calls a meeting with the representative of 
each agency. The main purpose of this meeting is to negotiate the bud­
get that will be appropriated to the agency for the next fiscal year. 
When the two parties come to a mutual agreement, the final proposal is 
submitted to the Deputy Minister of Finance for further revision. 
Believing that the agency administrators overestimate their 
budgets and lacking sufficient feedback information, the majority of 
the OBFs (approximately 71%) tend to cut these estimates as much as 
possible. In addition, the inadequate number of OBFs and the time 
span are attributable to these attitudes. The following excerpt 
typifies the OBFs responses: 
Q. What is your role in the budgetary process? 
A. Every OBF in this department is responsible primarily for 
reviewing all the agency requests in a whole sector of the 
economy. This function includes reviewing the agency's annual 
estimate in his section. Also, it includes the determining of 
the degree of compliance of the agency budget to the FYDP. 
When I receive the agency's request, I call a meeting with the 
agency representative to discuss the request. In this meeting, 
I negotiate with the agency representative in order to reach a 
final agreement for each item and project. I face many problems 
in these meetings. For example: 
•Nv 
(1) Most of the agencies substantially overestimate their 
requests without adequate justification; thus, I am forced to 
cut these requests substantially. 
(2) Feedback information is inadequate to make efficient deci­
sion. 
(3) Clarified objectives and purposes are lacking. 
(4) There are not enough personnel. 
(5) The time span to review all the agency requests in my 
sector is short. 
After reaching a final agreement with the agency representa­
tive, I submit it to the Deputy Minister of Finance for a final 
revision. 
The major role of the SBFs in the Saudi Arabian governmental 
budgetary process can be viewed as that of "assistants to the OBFs." 
Thus, they are responsible for preparing the feedback information for 
the OBFS. Also, they are responsible for controlling the degree of 
the agency's compliance with its budget during the execution stage. 
The evidence from the interviews and the personal observations 
suggests that the Ministry of Finance plays the most influencial role 
in developing the annual government budget. This role is embodied in 
the reviewing, collating, scrutinizing, and finalizing the whole 
government budget at both the OBF level and the top official level. 
Although there is no formal way of restricting the power of the 
Ministry, this power is also shared by the head of the agencies. Also, 
this power is restricted by the FYDP. In addition, the Ministry must 
take into consideration the general policy and desires of both the 
Council of Ministers and H. M. the King. The power of the Ministry of 
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Finance was expressed by one OBF as: 
"....Almost all of what the Ministry of Finance 
recommends will be in the final budget." 
The Ministry of Finance is also responsible for preauditing all 
government agency spending during the execution stage. Also, it is 
the responsibility of the Ministry to control the degree of agency 
compliance with both the budget and the FYDP. In addition, the agency 
must go through the Ministry of Finance when asking for supplemental 
funds or any changes in the original budget appropriations. 
The Decision Criteria and Their Effectiveness 
The interviews revealed that the decision making during the 
review cycle is a very complex process because of poorly defined 
criteria and objectives, the lack of a sufficient data base, the time 
limitation, and the small number of personnel. 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, the budgetary decisions in 
rich and certain countries are often incremental and are considered 
simple. In poor and certain countries, the certainty creates the 
(i 
simplicity in the budgetary decision making. The combination of both 
poverty and uncertainty causes complexity in budgetary decisions in 
poor and uncertain countries. Unlike those poor and uncertain count­
ries, the complexity of decision making in the Saudi Arabian govern­
mental budgetary process is caused not by the lack of resources but by 
insufficient guidelines and well-defined objectives. 
The interviews showed that the decision criteria in the review 
cycle vary according to the type of expenditures. The following is a 
summary of the most common criteria mentioned: 
(1) Salaries, General Expenditures, and Other Expenditures 
The interviews showed that reviewing the agency salaries 
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most of the time and effort of the OBFs. Historical precedent 
and the actual needs of the agency for human resources were the 
major criteria in reviewing these types of expenditures. 
Chapter II (general expenditures) were estimated primarily on 
the basis of the previous year expenditures. The decisions for 
other expenditures appropriations were based on actual needs and 
previous year spending efficiency. 
(2) Projects Under Construction and New Projects 
A large proportion of the Saudi Arabian budget is devoted 
each year to capital projects. Thus, an extensive effort has 
been employed to develop specific criteria as the basis for 
making the major decisions for this type of expenditure. In 
addition, the last few years have witnessed an improvement in 
the government accounting system. The most common criteria 
used by the OBFs were the FYDP, the agency's execution capacity, 
previous year spending efficiency, and the general economic 
conditions of the country. But no matter the degree of precise 
criteria, the execution of these projects encounters the same 
problems that were mentioned by Wildavsky in poor and uncertain 
countries: 
"Poor countries have trouble getting the work done. 
Projects may be delayed because the weather is bad, 
because necessary materials have not arrived from 
abroad, because plans were improperly drawn, because 
skilled labor cannot be found, because of excessive 
paper work...."4 
For these reasons and many others, most of the projects 
cannot be executed during the fiscal year. Thus, a major 
4 Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Process, 
p. 149. 
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complexity exists in the decision making for the next year's 
budget. 
Formal and Informal Contacts with the Other Participants and Their 
Results 
The interview results showed that the OBFs and SBFs used formal 
and informal contacts with agency officials to simplify the process of 
negotiations. Again, the lack of clarified criteria and sufficient 
information leads most of the OBFs to utilize this technique to arrive 
at a mutual agreement. Most of the OBFs stressed the importance of 
informal contacts with agency officials. These contacts helped to 
clarify formal instructions and simplify the process of regulations. 
Conclusions 
The interview results suggest the following conslusions: 
1. The Saudi Arabian government budget is formulated in a piecemeal 
and fragmented fashion. The budget or fiscal department of each agency 
is the primary place for developing and orchestrating its proposed 
request. However, both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance play major roles in this process. 
The Ministry of Planning, through the FYDP, outlines the agen­
cies' general objectives, specifies the agencies' programs and projects, 
and furnishes a rough estimate of the financial requirements to execute 
these projects and programs. After approval by the Council of Ministers 
and by H. M. the King, the FYDP becomes compulsory. Thus, all govern­
ment agencies must comply with the contents of the FYDP in preparing 
their annual budgets. The Ministry of Finance, through numerous direc­
tives, established the guidelines that must be followed in the formula­
tion of the budget. 
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The budget review is centralized in the budget department of 
the Ministry of Finance. After hearing the point of view of the agen­
cies through their representatives, this department organizes each 
agency's estimates into a unified, final form. Then the proposed budget 
for the entire country is extensively reviewed by a special committee. 
This committee is commonly headed by the Minister of Finance. It is in 
this committee that most of the final budgetary decisions are made. 
Thus, it would seem that the Ministry of Finance influences the output 
of the final budgetary decision more than any other government organi­
zation. 
The Council of Ministers, as the main legislative body, has the 
power to approve the country's annual budget. However, since the 
Ministry of Finance takes into consideration the general policies of 
the Council in preparing the final proposed budget, the Council members, 
through their representatives, also participate in budget formulation. 
The existence of the approval cycle seems to be for legitimacy purposes 
only. However, any major changes in the original budget must be 
e 
approved by the Council of Ministers. 
2. In all fifteen agencies, the directors and the staff of the 
budget department lack the necessary skills and professional training 
to perform their duties. This problem does not exist in the budget 
department of the Ministry of Finance, which does, however, face a 
shortage in staff that can review agency requests in the allotted time. 
Both problems have contributed to the lack of innovations in the budget­
ary process. 
3. The majority of the DBAs view their role as "coordinators" among 
the agency departments in the formulation of both the agency's plans 
•N,. 
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and annual budget requests. Although budgetary decisions are made by 
a special committee, most of the DBAs and involved in making these 
decisions through their participation on this committee. Moreover, the 
DBAs represent the agency in budget review hearings. Thus, most of the 
DBAs consider their role as "defender" of the agency's requests. The 
SBAs prepare the necessary information to aid in budget formulation and 
review. 
The role of DBFs can be viewed as that of "cutter" more than 
"efficiency economizer." Most of the OBFs tend to cut agency requests, 
believing that the agencies exaggerate their estimations. Although 
these officials do not have the authority to make final decisions, 
their views carry considerable weight. 
4. Complexity in calculation is commonly encountered throughout 
the budgetary process. However, the degree of complexity varies accord­
ing to the type of expenditure. Salaries and general expenditures are 
estimated mainly on the basis of both actual needs and prior budgetary 
appropriations. Thus, the majority of budgetary decisions for these 
types of expenditures are incremental in nature. Moreover, determining 
projects priority and cost is the most complex stage in the budget 
process. 
The lack of clarified objectives, specific criteria, an effi­
cient accounting system, qualified personnel, rapid changes in the 
country's economy, and numerous problems in the execution of projects 
are the major causes for this complexity. Finally, the complexity in 
project budget calculation induces most of the government agencies to 
over- or underestimate the cost of their projects. The result is 
either a decrease in the agencies' spending efficiency ratios or the 
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creation of supplemental budgets. 
The estimation of revenue is a very easy task in the budgetary 
process since oil is the main source of government revenues. Although 
balancing the budget is a very important step in the budgetary process, 
the cumulative wealth of the government is often used to cover any 
shortages in the annual revenue. 
5. The Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process exhibits a high 
level of strategizing. Spending agencies tend to exaggerate their 
estimates, knowing that the Ministry of Finance will alter their esti­
mates. The agencies' representatives utilize formal and informal con­
tacts to justify their requests. However, the frequency of strategic 
maneuvers is less than in poor and uncertain countries because uncer­
tainty always increases the frequency of strategic maneuvers. In those 
countries, the spending agencies will maneuver continuously, and the 
Ministry of Finance must tend to cut the agencies' requests dramati­
cally to remain viable. But the economic wealth in Saudi Arabia 
lessens the degree of strategizing. The spending agencies can always 
ask the Ministry of Finance for supplemental funds if these funds can 
be justified. 
II. Quantitative Budgetary Data Analysis 
This section presents the results of the second stage of the 
research - the analysis of quantitative budgetary data. Results of 
tests to determine the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian 
governmental budgetary process are presented first. Next, findings 
with respect to the existence of supplemental budgeting are detailed. 
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The final portion of this section presents results of the quantitative 
investigation to determine the influence of factors affecting the 
budgetary output. 
1. The Decree of Incrementalism in the Budgetary Process 
The first issue investigated in the quantitative phase of the 
study was the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabia governmental 
budgetary process. The study investigated the magnitued of budgetary 
changes from one year to the next as a means of testing the degree of 
incrementalism in a given budgetary process. The magnitude of change in 
budgetary allocation was defined as the ratio of allocation in a given 
fiscal year to the allocation in the preceding fiscal year. 
To perationalize the test of the degree of incrementalism, three 
categories were identified: 
I. "Incremental Process." The magnitude of change in budget­
ary allocation ranges from 1.00 to 1.10. 
II. "Relatively Incremental Process." The magnitude of change 
in budgetary allocation ranges from 1.11 to 1.30. 
III. "Non-Incremental Process." The magnitude of change in 
budgetary allocation is greater than 1.30 or less than 1.00. 
Table 1 displays the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocation 
for all major non-defense agencies (fiscal years 1973/1974 through 
1978/1979). As shown, the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocation 
for 69.64 percent (117 cases) of the 168 cases studied clearly were 
within the "Non-Incremental Process" range; 22.62 percent (38 cases) 
were within the "Relatively Incremental Process" range; and only 7.74 
percent (13 cases) were within the "Incremental Process" range. Also 
when viewed by fiscal year, the table reveals that a majority of the 
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agencies' budgetary processes were characterized by a "Non-Incremental 
Process" during most of the fiscal year studied. 
There were only two exceptions. During the 1976-77 fiscal year 
slightly less than a majority (46%) of the agencies were in the "non-incre-
mental" category. Over 54% of the cases were in either the "increment­
al" or "relatively incremental" category. The other exception, the 
1973-74 fiscal year, might be attributable to the fact that the 1974 
increase in oil prices, which is the main source of the government 
revenue, was not incorporated in the 1973/1974 budget. The results in 
Table 1 generally support Hypothesis No. 1; hence, the budgetary pro­
cess of most Saudi Arabian non-defense agencies can be characterized 
as a "Non-Incremental Process." 
A further analysis of the data revealed additional insight. 
Table 2 shows the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocations by 
type of expenditures. As displayed, the magnitude of changes in 
Chapters land II (salaries, and general expenditures, respectively) 
allocations for most of the cases studied were within the "increment­
al" and "relatively incremental process" ranges. Specifically, the 
magnitude of changes in Chapter I allocations for 52.38 percent of the 
168 cases were within the "incremental" and "relatively incremental" 
ranges, while 47-62 percent were within the "non-incremental" range. 
The magnitude of changes in Chapter II allocations for 64.88 percent 
of the 168 cases were within the "incremental" and "relatively incre­
mental" ranges, and 35.12 percent were within the range of "non-
incremental process." 
Table 2 also shows that the magnitude of changes in Chapters III 
and IV (other expenditures and projects, respectively) allocations for 
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TABLE 1. MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR ALL MAJOR 
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR FY 1973/74 - FY 1978/79. 
FISCAL 
YEARS 
INCREMENTAL 
1.0-1.10 ALL , 
t-1 
RELATIVELY 
INCREMENTAL 
NON-INCREMENTAL 
1.11-1.30 ALL_X ^1.0 or>l.30 ALL_X 
N N 
1973/74 
n=28 
7.14 14 50.0 12 42.86 
1974/75 
n=28 
3.57 4 14.29 23 82.14 
1975/76 
n=28 
0 3.57 27 96.43 
1976/77 
n=28 
1977/78 
n=28 
25.0 
7.14 
8 28.57 13 46.43 
6 21.43 20 71.43 
1978/79 
n=28 
3.57 5 17.86 22 78.57 
TOTAL 
n=168 
13 38 117 
MEAN 
PERCENTAGE 7.74 2 2 . 6 2  69.64 
v 
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TABLE 2. MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR ALL MAJOR 
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES, BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURES 
DURING THE FY 1973/74 - 1978/79. 
TYPE OF 
EXPENDITURE 
INCREMENTAL 
RELATIVELY 
INCREMENTAL NON-INCREMENTAL 
1.0-1.10 ALL , 1.11-1.30 ALL (1.0 or>1.30 ALL . 
t-1 t-1 t-1 
N N N 
Chapter I. 
Salaries 
n=168 
47 27.98 41 24.40 80 47.62 
Chapter II. 41 
General Expenditures 
n=168 
24.40 68 40.48 59 35.12 
Chapter III. 
Other Expenditures 
n=161 
43 26.71 37 22.98 81 50.31 
Chapter IV. 
Projects 
n=166 
19 11.45 15 9.04 132 79.52 
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most of the cases studied were clearly in the "non-incremental pro­
cess" range. In particular, the magnitude of changes in Chap.er III 
budgetary allocation for 50.31 percent of the 161 cases were within 
the "non-incremental process" range, while the magnitude of changes 
in Chapter IV budgetary allocations for 79.52 percent of the 166 
cases were within the "non-incremental process" range. 
The results in Table 2 suggested that the degree of increment-
alism in Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process varied accord­
ing to type of expenditure. The budgetary process for Chapters I and 
II can be characterized as either "incremental" or "relatively incre­
mental" process, while the budgetary process for Chapters III and IV 
are a clear case of "non-incremental" process. 
Also, the previous results are supported when the actual expen­
ditures were analyzed. Table 3 contains the magnitude of changes in 
actual expenditures for all major non-defense agencies during the 
fiscal years 1973/1974 through 1978/1979. As shown, the magnitude of 
changes in actual expenditures for 58.33 percent (98 cases) of the 
168 cases were within the "non-incremental process" range; 27.38 
(46 cases) were within the "relatively incremental process" range; and 
only 14.29 percent (24 cases) were in the range of "incremental 
process" range. Also when analyzed by fiscal years, the table shows 
that a majority of the agencies' budgetary processes were characterized 
by a "non-incremental process" during most of the fiscal years. Again, 
fiscal year 1973/1974 was the only exception. 
In summary, the results in Tables 1 and 3 suggested that the 
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be characterized in 
general as a "non-incremental process." Also, the findings in Table 2 
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TABLE 3. MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR ALL MAJOR 
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR FY 1973/74 - FY 1978/79. 
FISCAL 
YEARS 
1973/74 
n=28 
4 14.29 14 50.0 10 35.71 
1974/75 
n=28 
3 10.71 8 28.57 17 60.71 
1975/76 
n=28 
5 17.86 5 17.86 18 64.29 
1976/77 
n=28 
3 10.71 9 32.14 16 57.14 
1977/78 
n=28 
4 14.29 4 14.29 20 71.43 
1978/79 
n=28 
5 17.86 6 21.43 17 60.71 
TOTAL 
n=168 
24 46 98 
MEAN 
PERCENTAGE 14.29 27.38 58.33 
"RFT ATTVFT Y 
INCREMENTAL T^ ^.7t;,T NON-INCREMENTAL INCREMENTAL 
1.0-1.10 AE , 1.11-1.30 AE . /1.0 or>1.30 AE. . 
t-1 t-1 N ^ t-1 
N % N % N % 
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reveals that the degree of incrementalism varies somewhat according to 
the type of expenditures. The budgetary process for both salaries and 
general expenditures is represented by either "incremental" or "rela­
tively incremental" processes, while the process for other expendi­
tures and projects can be characterized as a purely "non-incremental 
process." 
2. The Existence of Supplemental Budgeting 
Since the existence of supplemental budgets implies the lack of 
an organization's capability to anticipate their short run needs, the 
second test investigated this indicator for each fiscal year. 
Hypothesis No. 2 stated that supplemental budgeting is a char­
acteristic of the budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defence 
agencies as evidenced by the existence of supplementary budget in the 
majority ( 50%) of the agencies for the majority ( 50%) of the fiscal 
years studied. 
In order to test this hypothesis, Table 4 shows the number and 
percentage of agencies which had or did not have a supplemental budget 
for each fiscal year. The data indicated that the majority of the 
government agencies engaged in supplemental budgeting during each of 
the six years studied. Specifically, 60.26 percent (94 cases) of the 
156 cases had a supplemental budget during the period of the study, 
while 39.74 percent did not. The results in Table 4 are consistent 
with a budgetary process characterized by frequent supplemental budgets. 
The quantitative data did not suggest reasons for this result. 
However, the interview results revealed additional insight. The inter­
view data indicated that most of the agencies engaged in supplemental 
budgets in spite of the agencies' low spending efficiencies. The vast 
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TABLE 4. SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETS FOR ALL NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR THE 
FY 1979/1974 - FY 1978/1979 
FISCAL 
YEARS 
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET 
Agencies with 
Supplemental 
Budgets 
N % 
Agencies Without 
Supplemental 
Budgets 
N t 
1973-1974 
n=26 
1974-1975 
n=26 
1975-1976 
n=26 
1976-1977 
n=26 
1977-1978 
n=26 
1978-1979 
n=26 
19 
18 
17 
15 
15 
10 
73.08 
69.23 
65.38 
57.69 
57.69 
38.46 
7 26.29 
8 30.77 
9 34.62 
11 42.31 
11 42.31 
16 61.54 
MEANS 94 60.26 62 39.74 
n=156 
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majority of the participants attributed this practice to the project 
cost estimation and execution. The lack of clarified criteria for 
cost estimation, ill-qualified personnel, and an insufficient account­
ing and feedback system led the agencies to over- or underestimate the 
cost of their projects. Overestimation creates the low spending effi­
ciency, while the underestimation creates the supplemental budget. 
The economic wealth in Saudi Arabia makes the budgetary process 
different from that in underdeveloped countries. In case of delay in 
project execution or underestimation of cost, the agencies systematic­
ally go to the Ministry of Finance for a supplemental budget. Limita­
tion, in economic resources in poor countries necessarily restrain 
such a practice. 
3. The Relationships Among the Participants in the Budgetary 
Process 
The next series of tests investigate the relationships between 
the budgetary participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary 
process. In particular the relationships between budget expansion 
(a dependent variable) and agency acquisitiveness, Ministry of Finance 
support, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and 
spending efficiency (as independent variables) are investigated. The 
dependent variable and the independent variables are operationally 
defined in Chapter III. 
Simple correlation was used to evaluate the significance of 
each independent variable. This analysis was performed for each 
agency. The agencies were then grouped by type, and simple correla­
tion was utilized to measure the significance of each independent 
variable for each type. Additionally, step-wise regression procedures 
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were performed to select the "best" independent variable(s) in explain-
int the variation in the dependent variable. 
1. Simple Correlation Analysis 
A. Single Agency Analysis 
As shown in Tables 5A - 5E, agency acquisitiveness and 
Ministry of Finance support play a major role in the budgetary 
process. The correlation between the Ministry of Finance support 
and budget expansion was significant for the majority of the 
government agencies. Specifically, the simple correlations 
between the Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion 
were significant for 69 percent (18 agencies) at .01 level. For 
only two agencies the correlation between the Ministry of Finance 
support and budget expansion was not significant at .10 level. 
Tables 5A - 5E show that there was significant correlation 
between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion. In parti­
cular, the correlations between these two variables were signi­
ficant in 4 agencies at .01 level. The correlation between 
agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion was not significant 
at .10 level in 15 agencies. However, the values of these corre­
lations were in the range of moderate correlation. 
The findings in Tables 5A - 5E reveal that the relation­
ships between Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion 
were stronger than the relationships between agency acquisitive­
ness and budget expansion. Specifically, the average simple 
correlation between Ministry of Finance support and budget expan­
sion was .87 and between agency acquisitiveness and budget expan­
sion was .65. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance seems 
-NJ. 
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TABLE 5A. CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION, 
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES). 
"ECONOMIC RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AGENCY 
AA MFS ERE ARE SE 
Agency #1 .046 . 981* .001 .091 .063 
Agency #2 .167 .949* -.540 -.467 -.547 
Agency #3 .401 .532 -.399 .111 -.236 
Agency #4 .570 .968* .037 .276 -.455 
Economic 
Resource .557 .981* -.057 .184 -.458 
Development #• 
Significant at .01 level 
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TABLE 5B. CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION, 
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES). 
"HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT" 
AGENCY 
AA 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MFS ERE ARE SE 
Agency #5 .935* 
Agency #6 .706 
, 995* 
. 983* 
-.078 
.512 
- .091 
.345 
.341 
-.310 
Agency #7 .633 
Agency #8 .680 
.964* 
.853** 
.604 
.723 T 
.260 
,376 
.050 
.528 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
,925* .996* .049 -.007 .092 
* Significant at .01 level 
Aft Significant at .05 level 
T Significant at .10 level 
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TABLE 5C. CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION, 
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES). 
"SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT" 
AGENCY 
AA 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MFS ERE ARE SE 
Agency it9 .584 ,810 T -.746 -.263 -.289 
Agency #10 .973* .976* -.141 -.191 >4]2 
Agency #11 .963* .982* -.181 -.358 .264 
Agency #12 -.342 .998* .950* .598 .090 
Agency #13 .820** .999* .221 .083 .249 
Agency #14 .878** .897* .274 .132 -.232 
Social and 
Cultural 
Development 
.643 .994* .399 .212 .265 
* Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
T Significant at .10 level 
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TABLE 5D. CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION, 
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES). 
"PHYSICAL INFRASTRACTION DEVELOPMENT" 
AGENCY 
AA 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MFS ERE ARE SE 
Agency #15 .650 .987* .220 .423 .175 
Agency #16 .837** .429 -.264 -.271 .600 
Agency #17 .859** .948* -.310 .050 -.416 
Agency #18 .397 .954* .373 .021 .349 
Agency #19 .827** .998* .204 .231 -.199 
Agency #20 .614 .879** .583 .227 .173 
Physical ,952* 
Infrastraction 
Development 
.997* .117 .262 -.009 
* Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
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TABLE 5E. CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION, 
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES). 
"ADMINISTRATIVE AND SERVICES" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AVjEiiNUX 
AA MFS ERE ARE SE 
Agency #21 .608 .890** .594 .366 .212 
Agency #22 .949* .937* -.156 -.435 .583 
Agency #23 .703 .905* .419 .312 .213 
Agency #24 .616 .827** .579 .620 .472 
Agency #25 .891** .977* -.005 -.214 -.168 
Agency #26 .872** .846** .084 -.074 -.027 
Administrative 
and Services .924* .973* .056 .108 .281 
All Agencies .906* .987* .361 .257 -.333 
* Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
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to influence the output of the final budgetary decisions more 
than individual agencies did. 
The results in Tables 5A - 5E also indicate that there 
were no significant correlations between budget expansion and 
the other independent variables. The correlation between esti­
mated revenue expansion and budget expansion ranged from a low 
of -.005 to a high of .950. In only 2 agencies was the corre­
lation between estimated revenue expansion and budget expansion 
significant at .10 level. The correlations between actual 
revenue expansion and budget expansion was not significant at 
.10 level. The correlations ranged as low as -.007 and as high 
as .62. Moreover, the spending efficiency was not significant 
at .10 level for any of the agencies in the study sample. 
In summary, the single agency analysis shows that a signi­
ficant correlation existed between budget expansion and agency 
acquisitiveness and between budget expansion and Ministry of 
Finance support. However, the correlation between budget expan­
sion and Ministry of Finance support was stronger than between 
budget expansion and agency acquisitiveness. Moreover, there 
were no significant correlations between budget expansion and 
estimated revenue expansion, between budget expansion and actual 
revenue expansion, and between spending efficiency and budget 
expansion (the other independent variables). These findings 
indicate that both Ministry of Finance and individual agencies 
play major roles in the budgetary process; however, the Minis­
try of Finance seems to influence the output of the final bud­
getary decisions more than individual agencies. 
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B. Aggregate Data Analysis 
As displayed in Table 5E, Ministry of Finance support and 
agency acquisitiveness played a major role in the budgetary 
process. For the entire period examined, the simple correlation 
between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion was .90 and 
between the Ministry of Finance support and the budget expansion 
was .98; each was significant at the .01 level. The aggregate 
data analysis reveals that both the Ministry of Finance and the 
government agencies influenced the budgetary output. 
The data in Tables 5A - 5E indicate that the simple corre­
lations between the Ministry of Finance support and budget 
expansion did not vary considerably upon the grouping agencies 
by types of services. In fact, the correlation between Ministry 
of Finance support and budgetary expansion was significant at 
the .01 level in all agency types. 
The correlation between agency acquisitiveness and budget 
expansion relatively varied from one type to another. This 
correlation was significant at .01 level in human resource 
development, physical infrastraction development, and adminis­
trative and service types (.925, .952, and .924, respectively). 
The correlation was not significant in economic resource devel­
opment and social and cultural development at .10 level (.557 
and .643, respectively). 
Tables 5A - 5E also show that a stronger correlation 
exists between Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion 
than between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion. 
Among all the agency types, the correlation between the Ministry 
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cf Finance support and budget expansion was stronger than 
between budget acquisitiveness and budget expansion. 
In summary, the aggregate data analysis shows that both 
the Ministry of Finance and the individual agencies (agency 
acquisitiveness) influenced the budgetary outputs. The role 
of the Ministry of Finance did not vary upon grouping agencies 
by type of services. However, the role of agencies varied from 
one type to another. Also, the Ministry of Finance seemed to 
influence the budgetary output more than agency acquisitiveness 
did. In addition, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue 
expansion, and spending efficiency were not significantly 
correlated with budget expansion. 
II. Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to make inference concerning the 
factor(s) that affect Saudi Arabian budget expansion. Step-wise multiple 
regression procedures were used to select statistically the independent 
variable(s) that significantly explain the variations in the dependent 
variable. The selection procedures were based on the t- statistics for 
2 
the regression coefficient and on the maximation of the R . 
Step-wise regression results for each fiscal year - cross-
sectional analysis - are displayed in Table 6. As shown, the following 
results were observed: 
1. Fiscal Year 1973/1974. The interaction of both Ministry 
of Finance support and spending efficiency explained 64 percent 
2 
of the variations in budget expansion (R changes = .570 and 
.072, respectively. F was significant at .01 level). T-
statistics for the regression coefficient of both variables were 
TABLE 6. THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET EXPANSION - STEP-WISE REGRESSION RESULTS 
FISCAL YEAR 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INTERCEPT AA MFS ERE ARE SE 
F 
VALUE 
1973-1974 
Regression Coefficient 
t Value 
R^ Change 
48.337 .062 
.70 
.008 
.947 
5.33* 
.570 
-.652 .650 13.61* 
-2.08** 
.072 
1974-1975 
Regression Coefficient -2.519 
t Value 
R^ Change 
1975-1976 
Regression Coefficient 147.938 
t Value 
R^ Change 
.106 
1.30 
.006 
1.004 
15.59* 
.925 
.617 
.87 
.031 
.931 154.51* 
.031 .75 
1976-1977 
Regreesion Coefficient 
t Value 
r2 Change 
1977-1978 
Regression Coefficient 
t Value 
R^ Change 
-1.353 
-17.879 
.193 
2.15** 
.052 
.863 
4.85* 
.632 
1.064 
5.02* 
4.98 
.324 
1.52+ 
043 
.694 26.06* 
.541 13.56* 
1978-1979 
Regression Coefficient 
t Value 
R^ Change 
27.409 1.005 
10.46* 
.813 
-.190 
1.37 
.014 
.827 54.85* 
* Significant at .01 level ** Significant at .05 level + Significant at .10 level 
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significant at .01 level. 
2. Fiscal Year 1974/1975. Ministry of Finance support explain-
2 
ed 93 percent of the variations in budget expansion (R = .925, 
F was significant at .01 level), t- statistics for the regres­
sion coefficient were significant at .01 level. 
3. Fiscal Year 1975/1976. Ministry of Finance support explain­
ed only 3 percent of the variation in budget expansion. None of 
the independent variables were significant at .10 level. F-
was not significant at .10 level. 
4. Fiscal Year 1976/1977. The interaction of both agency 
acquisitiveness and Ministry of Finance support explained 69 
2 percent of the variation in budget expansion (R changes = .062 
and .632, respectively, F was significant at .01 level), t-
statistics for the regression coefficient of agency acquisitive­
ness was significant at .05 level and the t- statistic for the 
regression coefficient of agency acquisitiveness was signifi­
cant at .01 level. 
5. Fiscal Year 1977/1978. The interaction of both Ministry 
of Finance support and spending efficiency explained 54 percent 
2 
of the variations in budget expansion (R changes = .498 and 
.043, respectively, F value was significant at .01 level). The 
t- statistic for the regression coefficient of the Ministry of 
Finance support was significant at .01 level, and the t- statis­
tic for the regression coefficient of agency acquisitiveness 
was significant at .10 level. 
6. Fiscal Year 1978/1979. Ministry of Finance support ex­
plained 81 percent of the variations in budget expansion 
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2 (R = .813, F was significant at .01 level). The t statistics 
for the regression coefficient was significant at .01 level. 
The above findings indicate that Ministry of Finance support is 
the dominant independent variable, explaining most of the variation in 
budget expansion. However, the interaction of both Ministry of Finance 
support and spending efficiency increased the correlation with budget 
expansion in two fiscal years. Moreover, the interaction of both 
Ministry of Finance and agency acquisitiveness increased the correla­
tion with budget expansion in one fiscal year. Therefore, spending 
efficiency and agency acquisitiveness are contributing influences to 
the primary factor, Ministry of Finance support, in explaining the 
variation in budget expansion in the Saudi Arabian budgetary process. 
Conclusions 
Based on the quantitative budgetary data analysis, the following 
conclusions were reached: 
(1) The saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be charac­
terized as a "non-incremental process." However, the degree of incre-
mentalism varies according to the type of expenditures. The budgetary 
process for both salaries and general expenditures are consistent with 
an "incremental or "relatively incremental process," while the process 
for both other expenditures and projects could be characterized as 
"non-incremental Process." 
(2) The majority of the Saudi Arabian government agencies engaged 
in supplemental budgeting during each of the six fiscal years studied. 
(3) Significant positive correlations were found between budget 
expansion (the dependent variable) and agency acquisitiveness, as well 
as between budget expansion and Ministry of Finance support. 
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(4) A stronger positive correlation was found between budget expan­
sion and Ministry of Finance support than between budget expansion and 
agency acquisitiveness. 
(5) A significant correlation was not found between budget expan­
sion and estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion and 
spending efficiency. 
(6) Ministry of Finance support was found to be the dominant inde­
pendent variable that explained most of the variation in budget expan­
sion. Thus, the Ministry of Finance seemed to influence the output of 
the final budgetary decision more than any other factor. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
As reflected by the literature, the environment of each country 
influences the budgetary process in that country. Often-cited factors 
which shape this environment are: economic wealth, financial predict­
ability, political institutions, elite values, and size. Economic 
wealth and financial predictability are considered the most powerful 
factors. Economic wealth refers to the availability of resources with 
which to finance the budgetary goals. Rich countries are those with 
economic wealth sufficient to finance needed programs. Poor countries 
have precisely the opposite conditions. Financial predictability refers 
to the ability to anticipate flow of available resources in relation to 
spending commitments. Certain countries have the ability to calculate 
the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past 
and to project them into the near future.^ The per capita gross 
national product was used to distinguish between rich and poor count­
ries, a poor country being one with a low per capita gross national 
product relative to per capita GNP in most Western European countries 
and the United States. In uncertain budgetary environments future 
revenue and/or expenditures cannot be forecast with much probability 
"Hlildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Processes, pp. 10-13. 
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of occurrence. Financial predictability is a relative concept. How­
ever, uncertain budgetary environments are similar in several respects, 
including lack of sufficient information, shortage in qualified human 
resources, lack of diversification of sources of revenues, and lack of 
administrative capability. 
Economic wealth and financial predictability permit four classi­
fications of budgetary environments, namely: rich and certain; poor 
and certain; poor and uncertain; and rich and uncertain environments. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan are examples 
of countries with rich and certain environments. Poor and certain 
environments exist in American cities, where the budgetary process is 
certain with respect to financial predictability but poor with respect 
to economic wealth. Poor and uncertain environments exist in most of 
the underdeveloped countries. Each of these three classes of budgetary 
environments has been investigated in the existing literature. Their 
common characteristics have been identified, and the major behavioral 
differences among their budgetary participants have been outlined. 
However, the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments has 
never been investigated. One authority explains: 
"Budgetary process falling the rich and 
uncertain box will not be discussed....because 
I have not been able to find accounts of contem­
porary governments with these characteristics. 
Saudi Arabia is in fact a government with both wealth and 
environmental uncertainty, and therefore fits in the fourth classifica­
tion. In Saudi Arabia, the per capita gross national product is on the 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
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same level as previously mentioned rich countries (1980 gross national 
3 product per capita was estimated to be $15,700). However, Saudi 
Arabia's current income is high. Rather than the result of manufac­
turing and industry, this income is results from an inexpensive trans­
fer of capital in the form of oil into capital, in the form of money. 
In addition, the Saudi Arabian agencies are not able to calculate 
expenditures in the recent past nor project them into the near future. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine empirically the 
characteristics of the government budgetary process in which the envi­
ronment is uncertain but where the government is rich. 
The study was carried out in four major phases. 
First, the theory that exists to explain the governmental 
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing government 
within that country is examined. 
Second, the characteristics of budgetary processes in the first 
three classes of budgetary environments (Rich/Certain, Poor/Certain, 
and Poor/Uncertain) are reviewed. 
Third, the characteristics of the budgetary process in rich and 
uncertain environment are examined empirically. This phase involves 
several stages. The role perceptions of the major participants in the 
Saudi Arabian government budgetary process are analyzed; the charac­
teristics of the country's governmental budgetary processes are empir­
ically examined; and preliminary recommendations for the improvement of 
the country's governmental budgetary process are developed. 
3 U. S. Department of State, Foreign Economic Trends and Their 
Implications for the United States, International Marketing Informa­
tion Series, Number 79 - 150, p. 2. 
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Finally, the characteristics of the budgetary processes in rich 
and uncertain environments are compared with the other three classes 
of the budgetary environments. 
Since no previous study has been conducted to investigate the 
budgetary process in rich and certain environments, the reliance on a 
single research method to examine the budgetary process in this 
environment was unavailable. Therefore, a combination of different 
research methods were used to gather the relevant data for this study. 
This combination included library research, interviews, and empiricial 
testing of the quantitative budgetary data. In particular, open-end 
interviews were conducted with 47 budgetary participants. The objec­
tives of the open-end interviews were twofold, nr.mely: (1) to provide 
adequate knowledge (or a descriptive picture) of the Saudi Arabian 
governmental budgetary process, and (2) to describe and analyze the 
role perception of the participants in the budgetary process. The 
result of these interviews were reported in Chapter III. 
The characteristics of the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary 
process and the relationships among the budgetary participants were 
investigated through analyzing quantitative budgetary data. Data from 
26 selected agencies over a period of six years (FY 1973/1974 through 
FY 1978/1979) were collected and analyzed. Three steps were used, 
namely: 
(1) Testing the degree of incrementalism in the process by employ­
ing the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocations. 
(2) Examining the capability of the government agencies in antici­
pating their short run needs by analyzing the number and percentage 
of agencies that engaged in supplemental budgeting. 
•K.. 
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(3) Investigating the relationships between budget expansion (the 
dependent variables) and Ministry of Finance support, agency acquisi­
tiveness, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and 
spending efficiency (the independent variables) by employing the sta­
tistical tools of simple correlations, regression analysis, and step­
wise multiple regression procedures. The data were analyzed for each 
of the 26 agencies, for the six fiscal years (cross-sectional analy­
sis) , and for type of agency. The results of these analyses are 
reported in Chapter III. 
Consolidation of the Study Conclusions 
The evidence suggests that the Saudi Arabian governmental bud­
getary process can be characterized as a non-incremental process. 
Specifically, the interview results showed that complexity in calcula­
tions was a common attribute throughout the budgetary process. The 
determination of the projects' priorities and the estimation of their 
cost, as well as the numerous problems in projects' execution, were 
determined to be the major causes of this complexity. 
The complexity in calculation led most of the government agencies 
to either over- or underestimate their requests, thus compelling the 
Ministry of Finance to review the entire agency requests instead of 
concentrating on the changes or the increments from last year's appro­
priations. In addition, the dramatic changes in the country's economy 
forced the Ministry of Finance to give less weight to last year's 
appropriations and to review the budget on a yearly basis. Hence, 
most of the project decisions were non-incremental in nature. 
Salaries and general expenditures were estimated on the basis 
of actual needs and, more importantly, on the basis of previous year's 
•*\J. 
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appropriations. Thus, the budgetary decision for these types concen­
trated on the increment or the changes from previous year appropriations 
and were incremental in nature. 
The evidence from the quantitative budgetary data also supported 
the above conclusions. The magnitude of changes in budgetary alloca­
tions and actual expenditures for most of the cases studied were in the 
range of "non-incremental" process. However, the degree of increment-
alism varied according to the type of expenditures. The budgetary 
process for both salaries and general expenditures suggested incre­
mental or relatively incremental process while the process both for 
other expenditures and for projects was non-incremental in nature. 
The results of both research tools showed that supplemental 
budgeting was one of the major attributes of the Saudi Arabian budget­
ary process. The interview indicated that the government agencies 
used these budgets extensively to overcome uncertainties in predicting 
their future needs. Economic wealth has contributed a great deal to 
the existence of these budgets. However, the agencies must justify 
the needs for any changes in the original budget. The quantitative 
budgetary data also revealed that the majority of the government 
agencies required supplemental budgets during each of the six years 
surveyed. 
The interview results showed that the lack of skilled and highly 
trained professionals was the rule, not the exception, among the 
government agencies. However, this problem did not exist in the 
budget department of the Ministry of Finance. This department did 
face, however, shortage in the number of staff. Both problems con­
tributed to the absence of innovations in the budgetary process. 
-KJ 
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The budgetary process suffered substantially from the lack of 
well-defined decision criteria. This problem led most of the govern­
ment agencies to over- or underestimate their requests. In fact, the 
vast majority of the participants called for clarifying the decision 
criteria. However, extensive efforts have been devoted throughout 
the entire government organization since the 1970's in overcoming this 
problem. The Five-Years Development Plan was actually a step in that 
direction. Also, the numerous directives issued by the Ministry of 
Finance lessened the degree of this problem. 
The absence of modern data-gathering and data-reporting tech­
niques was observed throughout the budgetary process. The existing 
accounting and budgeting system are not sufficient to provide the 
necessary feedback information. 
The results of both research tools revealed that spending 
agencies and the Ministry of Finance played major roles in the budget 
output decisions. However, the Ministry of Finance seemed to influ­
ence the output of the final budget. 
The interview results showed that the formulation cycle is a 
coordinated effort of various government organizations. The budget 
or fiscal department at each agency is the primary place for develop­
ing and orchestrating its proposed requests. However, both the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning play a major role in 
this cycle. The Ministry of Planning, through the FYDP, outlines the 
agencies' general objectives, specifies the agencies' programs and 
projects, and furnishes a rough estimate of the financial require­
ments to execute these projects and programs. The Ministry of Finance 
has the sole responsibility for reviewing the agencies' proposed 
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requests and making the final budgetary decisions. However, the 
Council of Ministers, as the main legislative body, has the power to 
approve the country's annual budget. 
The interview data revealed that the majority of the DBAs viewed 
their role as "coordinator" among the agency's departments in formula­
tion of both the agency's plans and annual budget request, rather than 
ad "decision maker." Most of the agency budget decisions were made by 
special committees in which the DBAs participated extensively. In 
contrast, the role of OBFs could be viewed as that of "cutter" more 
than :efficiency economizer." Most of the OBFs tended to cut the 
agencies' requests, believing that they had exaggerated in their esti­
mation. The budgetary process showed a high level of strategizing. 
Spending agencies tended to exaggerate their estimates, knowing that 
the Ministry of Finance would alter their estimates. This resulted in 
utilizing formal and informal contacts by both the agencies' represent­
atives and the staff of the budget department to achieve mutual agree­
ments . 
The quantitative budgetary data seemed to support the inter­
views ' results concerning the relationships between the budgetary 
participants. Significant positive correlations were found between 
budget expansion and both agency acquisitiveness and Ministry of 
Finance support. The correlations between budget expansion and 
Ministry of Finance support was stronger than the correlations between 
budget expansion and agency acquisitiveness. Moreover, there were no 
significant correlations among budget expansion and estimated revenue 
expansion, actual revenue expansion, and spending efficiency. Since 
the Ministry of Planning has a major influence on agency acquisitiveness, 
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the simple correlation indicated that these three organizations affect­
ed the final budgetary output. However, the multiple regression analy­
sis showed that the Ministry of Finance support was the independent 
variable that explained most of the variation in budget expenditure. 
The final objective of this study is to compare its conclusions 
with the research findings in other budgetary environments. These 
comparisons are limited to the characteristics of the budgetary pro-
ess, frequency of strategic maneuvers, and the degree of complexity in 
calculations. Figure 7 displays a summary of the characteristics of 
the budgetary process, frequency of the strategic maneuvers, and the 
degree of complexity in calculations for the three classes of budget­
ary environments (rich and certain, poor and certain, and poor and 
4 
uncertain) and their counterparts in the Saudi Arabian governmental 
budgetary process. 
"Rich and certain environment" refers to a budgetary system 
which has the ability to mobilize sufficient resources or to control 
expenditures, or both, and which has the ability to calculate the flow 
of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to 
project them into the near future. The budgetary processes in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany are examples of 
this budgetary environment. The budgetary process in these countries 
classified as rich and certain is incremental. Past decisions serve 
as bases from which future expenditures are determined, and the budget­
ary processes are concerned with adding or subtracting a small percent­
age (increment) to or from the existing base. 
4 
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Process, pp. 5-231. 
Figure 7. Summary of the Characteristics of the Budgetary Processes, Frequency of the Strategic Maneuvers, 
and the Degree of Complexity in the Calculation for the Three Classes of Budgetary Environments, 
and Their Counterparts in the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process. 
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"Poor and certain environment" refers to a budgetary system 
which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the lack 
of which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the 
lack of resources) or to control expenditures, or both, but which has 
the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, 
in the immediate past and to project them into the near future. The 
budgetary process in most American city governments is the best example 
of this budgetary environment. Most American cities are in a poor -
resources position, but they have significant financial predictability. 
The budgetary process in this environment becomes a whole revenue 
control - orientation due to the poor resource position. City offi­
cials are aware of the needs of the city, but they must compromise 
their needs considerably in the fact of limited resources. So, the 
budgeting process in the poor and uncertain environment is revenue 
oriented because income determines expenditures. 
"Poor and uncertain environment" refers to a budgetary system 
which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the lack 
of resources) or to control expenditures, or both, and which is 
unable to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in 
the immediate past and to project them into the near future. The bud­
getary process in India, Pakistan, Egypt, and other poor countries is 
an example of this budgetary environment. The poor and uncertain 
nations employ a budgetary process of repetition. Poverty leads them 
to delay expenditures to ensure that their financial resources are 
not depleted, whereas uncertainty causes them to reprogram funds 
repeatedly in order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. So, the 
budgetary process in poor and uncertain environments can be characterized 
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as repetitive budgeting. 
"Rich and uncertain environment" refers to a budgeting system 
which has the ability to mobilize sufficient resources but which is 
unable to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in 
the immediate past and to project them into the near future. The 
budgetary process in Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this budgetary 
environment. This category seems to be a paradox since certainty is 
usually a result of wealth. However, this researcher believes that 
Saudi Arabia is a country which occupies this unique position. Saudi 
Arabia does not possess the productive factors of manufacturing, agri­
culture, and banking, which make the United States, The United Kingdom, 
and France wealth countries. However, Saudi Arabia has a high current 
income, which, according to the operational definition of economic 
wealth, makes Saudi Arabia a wealth country (GNP per capita is approx­
imately $15,700). So, Saudi Arabia possesses the financial resources, 
but does not have the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures in 
the immediate past nor to project them into the near future. The 
results show that the government agencies spent an average of 61 per­
cent of their original appropriation during the period of the study. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the budgetary process in Saudi 
Arabia differ from those in poor countries (those without money) and 
in rich countries which are certain about their budgets. 
The interview results and the quantitative budgetary data pro­
vided ample evidence that the budgetary process of the Saudi Arabian 
government is a non-incremental process combined with supplemental 
budgeting. Both Saudi Arabian and rich and certain countries share the 
common attribute of economic wealth; however, the budgetary process of 
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Saudi Arabia differs from these countries due to uncertainty in calcu­
lating the flow of expenditures in the immediate past and in projecting 
them into the near future. The past decisions in rich and certain 
countries serve as bases from which future expenditures are determined 
arid budgetary processes are concerned with adding or subtracting a 
small percentage (increment) to or from the existing base. By contrast, 
both spending agencies and the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia do 
not rely heavily on past decisions as bases from which future expendi­
tures are determined especially for projects expenditures. In fact, 
uncertainty leads both groups to reevaluate the whole government budget 
on a year to year basis instead of concentrating on only the changes 
from the last decision. 
The budgetary process in Saudi Arabia is different from those of 
poor and uncertain countries. Both share the uncertainty factor. Poor 
and uncertain countries employ repetitive budgeting. Poverty leads 
them to delay expenditures to ensure that their financial resources are 
not depleted, where uncertainty causes them to reprogram funds repeated­
ly in order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. By contrast, 
economic wealth in Saudi Arabia extenuates the uncertainty in the 
budgetary process. Spending agencies engage in supplemental budgeting 
to cover any shortage in the original funds. Also, the Ministry of 
Finance utilizes the cumulative wealth to overcome revenue shortages. 
Poverty in poor and uncertain countries disallows such practice. 
The budgetary strategies are most used in poor and uncertain 
environments. The existing poverty and uncertainty .increase the 
strategic maneuvers among the budget participants. The reason for this 
phenomenon is that the administrative agencies are not sure of their 
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needs, and at the same time, the control organ does not have the 
financial capability to grant the agencies' requests; hence, the 
administrative agencies tend to exaggerate their requests, knowing in 
advance that they will be substantially altered by the control organ. 
The administrative agencies in poor and uncertain environments 
frequently utilize strategic maneuvers in order to survive, and the 
control organ uses severe and erratic reductions due to the uncertainty 
about future funds. 
The participants in rich and certain environments use modest 
amounts of strategic activities. In this environment the resources are 
abundant, but the ways and means of requesting and appropriating speci­
fic funds are limited by sharply held expectations of desirable conduct. 
The relationships between the administrative agencies and the control 
organ in this environment are highly determined and gross departures 
from this expectation are easy to discover. So, the budget partici­
pants in this environment do not rely heavily on strategic maneuvers. 
Budgetary strategies are used least in poor and certain environ­
ment. Due to the lack of resources and certainty in predicting future 
funds, the budgetary relationships among participants are highly pre­
dictable. Any departure from this pre-determined relationship is easy 
to discover. So, the budget participants in this environment use 
4 
strategic maneuvers less than any other environment. 
The participants in a Saudi Arabia budgetary process use a high 
level of strategic activities. However, the frquency of strategic 
maneuvers is less than in poor and uncertain countries and higher than 
^Ib id. 
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in both rich and certain and poor and uncertain environments. The 
budgetary participants in rich and certain and poor and uncertain 
environments do not rely heavily on strategic maneuvers since the 
relationships between the participants are highly determined and any 
gross departures from this expectation are easy to discover. In con­
trast, uncertainty compels the spending agencies in Saudi Arabia to 
exaggerate their requests, and also compels the Ministry of Finance to 
cut these requests. Both use formal and informal contacts in order to 
arrive at mutual agreements - without relying on well defined objec­
tives and criteria. Moreover, uncertainty increases the frequency of 
strategic maneuvers, as in poor and uncertain countries, but the 
economic wealth reduces the level of those activities among the parti­
cipants in Saudi Arabian budgetary process, Spending agencies can be 
satisfied with their original appropriation since they can ask for a 
supplemental appropriation to cover any unforeseen conditions. 
Poverty in poor uncertain countries prohibits such practice. 
In those countries, spending agencies utilize strategic maneuvers in 
order to survive. The control organ uses strategic maneuvers due to 
the lack of funds. The poor and uncertain environment has the most 
complicated budgetary process of all environments. Poverty and uncer­
tainty in this environment make it difficult for the budget participant 
to predict next year's budget, so the budget becomes meaningless'. Any 
one financial year is likely to be quite different from last or next 
year's budget in terms of revenue, expenditures, foreign aid, or infla­
tion; hence, the budgetary process in this environment becomes very 
complex in calculating the budget, and most of the time it is arbitrary. 
Because of wealth and certainty, the budget process in rich and certain 
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environment is the simplest in calculations compared to other environ­
ments. Rich and certain nations generally budget by increments (last 
year's budget plus or minus a certain percentage). So, the administra­
tive agencies in these environments request certain funds with this 
relationship in mind. The control organ acts almost in the same manner. 
Hence, the budgetary process is very simple compared to that in the 
other environments. The degree of complexity in the calculation in 
poor and certain lies between these two extremes. Certainty in this 
environment creates simplicity in calculation, but poverty limits 
change in the budget's original base."* 
The calculation of the Saudi Arabian budget is a very complex 
process. Uncertainty makes it difficult for the budget participants 
to predict next year's budget. However, the degree of the complexity 
is less than in poor and uncertain environments. Economic wealth 
decreases the degree of complexity since the government has the econo­
mic leverage to overcome any mistake in calculation. 
Recommendations 
1. Establishment of an independent budget department in all govern­
ment organizations. The trend in the last decade to establish an 
independent budget department in some agencies to formulate the agency's 
plans and its annual requests is a step in the right direction. How­
ever, the researcher noticed that planning, budgeting, and accounting 
matters in other agencies are still performed by one department, 
namely: The Fiscal Department Affairs. Thus, establishment of an 
independent budget department in those agencies to carry the 
5Ibid. 
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responsibility of plans and request formulation is recommended. The 
responsibilities of both the budget and the fiscal department must be 
well defined. Moreover, a channel of communications must be estab­
lished between these two departments. 
2.' Establishment of a cost accounting unit in each budget depart­
ment. The study results indicated that the budgeting decision-making 
process at the agency level suffered substantially from the lack of 
the necessary feedback information. In order to overcome this defi­
ciency, a centralized cost accounting unit should be established with­
in each budget department. The main responsibility of this unit would 
be to provide cost/benefit analysis to the decision maker and to 
furnish monthly reports. The cost accounting unit must utilize modern 
data-gathering techniques and be equipped with modern data-processing 
hardware, as well as being staffed with qualified personnel. Further­
more, a channel of communication should be established between this 
unit and the fiscal department and the other agencies. 
3. Increase the formal and informal training of all levels of per­
sonnel in each agency's budget and fiscal departments. As mentioned 
before, the absence of skilled and highly trained budgetary profes­
sionals was the rule not the exception in all of those departments. 
This problem has discouraged any budgetary innovations. The budget 
and fiscal departments must encourage their employees to participate 
in the accounting and budget courses that are offered through the 
countries universities and the Public Administration Institute. 
4. Increase the degree of linkage between the five-year develop­
ment plans and the annual budget. Concerning the annual budget, the 
FYDP outlines the general objectives of each government organization, 
•K. 
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specifies the detailed projects and programs to achieve these objec­
tives, and forecasts the financial requirements for these projects and 
programs. Officially, the FYDP furnishes the basic outlines for the 
formulation of the country's annual budget. However, the results of 
the study suggested the difficulty of adherence to the plan in prepar­
ing the annual budget. The writer is not an advocate of introducing 
PPBs or ZBBs into the Saudi Arabia governmentary process at this time; 
however, increasing the linkage between the FYDP and budget preparation 
is essential. 
5. Improvement of budget execution. Wildavsky pointed out that 
poor countries have common problems in budget execution, such as, delay 
in project execution due to bad weather, delay in delivery of materials, 
insufficient plans, ill-qualified personnel, and excessive paper work. 
Due to the economic wealth in Saudi Arabia, the severity of 
these problems is less than in poor countries. However, uncertainty in 
the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process leads most of the 
government agencies to delay some of the planned projects, thus, increas­
ing the degree of complexity of decision-making for the next year's 
budget. 
The last decade has witnessed extensive efforts by all government 
agencies and organizations to improve budget execution. These efforts 
are steps in the right direction. However, more efforts are recommend­
ed in order to decrease the degree of complexity of the decision-making 
process. These efforts may take any or all of the following paths: 
£ Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Process, p. 149. 
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(a) Increase of the responsibility of the Ministry of Public 
Works and Housing to include control of all government projects 
execution and preparation of monthly reports on the progress of 
all government projects. 
(b) Separation between the budgetary processes for recurrent 
expenditures and project expenditures. 
(c) Extension of the project budgetary cycles from their 
present one-year cycle to a two-year cycle thereby allowing 
more time for project decisions. 
(d) Increase in the degree of cooperation among all government 
organizations in project executions. 
(e) Improvement of the financial and accounting guidelines. 
6. Establishment of a committee to study the government accounting 
system. This committee may be composed of the members of the profes­
sional and academic communities. 
7. Establishment of well-defined decision criteria throughout all 
the budget cycles. 
8. Improvement of the budget classifications. Due to the rapid 
increase in government activities, relevant information is more essen­
tial now than ever before; such information is not generated by the 
traditional Saudi Arabian budgetary process. Although the traditional 
budget promotes "Accountability" by emphasizing the control over 
administrative spending abuses, the traditional budget does not focus 
upon budget output or the accomplishment of governmental goals. The 
government agencies are advised to focus on program, program 
cost and program outputs in formulating their requests, instead of 
focusing upon item cost. In addition, the Ministry of Finance should 
+v. 
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review the budget on the basis of programs rather than line items. 
This approach would be easy to accomplish in Saudi Arabia's govern­
mental budgetary process since it is reviewed and approved in a 
centralized fashion, in contrast to the process in countries where the 
budget is reviewed and approved in fragmented fashion. 
9. Establishment of a cost accounting unit within the budget 
department of the Ministry of Finance. The responsibility of this unit 
is to furnish basic feedback information to the budget reviewers. 
10. Increase the number of budget reviewers at the budget department 
of the Ministry of Finance. The study showed that this department, 
unlike the budget department of the agencies, does not lack profession­
al personnel. However, it does have an inadequate number of personnel 
to perform its functions in the required time span. The Ministry of 
Finance is advised to make an extensive effort to hire additional 
professionals. 
11. Improvements in audit procedures and reporting. A committee 
should be established to study the audit procedures and reporting. As 
an initial step, both the Ministry of Finance and the Audit. Bureau 
should be encouraged to issue monthly reports in pre- and post-audit. 
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OPEN-END INTERVIEW SCHEDULE* 
I. The following questions will be asked of the various participants 
in- the budgetary process. 
- To start with, would you give me a brief biographical sketch of 
yourself? Please include your educational and occupational back­
ground . 
- What is your current position? 
What is your role in the budgetary process? 
II. The following questions will be asked of the agency's budget 
officials. 
- How does your agency go about drawing up its annual budgetary 
request? 
How many people and work hours are involved with the development 
of your agency's request? 
What criteria do you use in evaluating each departmental request? 
- How effective are these criteria? 
What criteria do, you use to judge whether an item should be 
included in your agency's request? Why? 
How effective are these criteria? 
Are you formally or informally in contact with other agency 
budget officers concerning your request? 
*The open-end interview is adapted with some modifications from 
Caputo, David Arman, The Normative and Empirical Implications of the 
Budgetary Process of Four Medium-size Cities, unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Yale University, 1970. 
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- What are the results of these contacts and how effective are 
they? 
- After you have submitted your agency's request to the Budget 
Department, what does your office do? 
- Are you formally or informally in contact with the Budget 
Department's officers concerning your requests? 
- What effect do these contacts have on your subsequent request? 
What criteria does the General Budget Department use to evaluate 
your agency's request? 
- How effective are these criteria? 
- After the agency's budget is spproved, what does your office do? 
During the execution stage, does your agency request supplement­
ary funds? If yes, why? 
- What criteria does the budget officer use to evaluate the supple­
mentary request? 
Are there any other items pertaining to the budgetary process 
you feel are important, but which I have left out? 
Finally, what suggestions do you think could improve the budget 
process in Saudi Arabia? 
III. The following questions will be asked of the Budget Department 
officials (Ministry of Finance). 
- How does the Budget Department go about reviewing the approving 
each agency's annual budget? 
- How does the Budget Department go about reviewing and approving 
the whole governmental budget? 
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How many people and work hours are involved with the development 
of the governmental budget? 
What criteria does your office use in reviewing and approving 
each agency's budget? 
How effective are these criteria? 
Does your office give equal treatment to all agencies' requests? 
Why? 
Does your office contact other agencies concerning their 
requests? 
What effect do these contacts have on the budget review and 
approval? 
After approving the governmental budget, what role does your 
office have in the budget execution? 
During the execution stage, does your office approve any supple­
mentary funds to the agencies? If yes, why? 
What criteria does your office use to evaluate the supplementary 
requests? 
What suggestions do you think could improve the budgetary process 
in Saudi Arabia? 
Finally, are there any items pertaining to the budgetary process 
you feel important, but which I have left out? 
APPENDIX II 
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